



Global Philanthropy Tracker 2023



Contents

Tables and Figures	01
Introduction.	02
Key Findings.	04
Suggestions	06
What Does the Report Measure?	08
Data in Context: Setting the Stage	12
<i>Spotlight on Giving to Ukraine</i>	14
Part I: Total Cross-Border Resource Flows	20
A. Total Cross-Border Resource Flows.	20
B. Official and Private Foreign Assistance.	26
Part II: Cross-Border Philanthropy	28
A. Legal Environment for Cross-Border Philanthropy	30
B. Philanthropic Outflows by Donor Countries' Income Level	33
C. United Nations Sustainable Development Goals	36
D. Cross-Border Philanthropy by Charitable Causes	38
<i>Spotlight on Global Philanthropic Responses towards the Fight against the COVID-19 Pandemic.</i>	39
E. Recipients of Cross-Border Philanthropy by Region	42
<i>Spotlight on Cross-Border Philanthropy and Climate Change.</i>	43
F. Cross-Border Volunteering	46
Part III. Other Cross-Border Resource Flows.	52
A. Official Development Assistance	52
B. Remittances	55
<i>Spotlight on Diaspora Philanthropy</i>	59
C. Private Capital Investment	62
Looking Ahead	64
Methodology	66
References.	68
Acknowledgments.	76

Tables and Figures

Figures

Figure 1. Total cross-border resources from 47 countries by flow, 2020 *(in billions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)* 20

Figure 2. Total cross-border private resource flows (philanthropic outflows, remittances, and private capital investment), compared with official development assistance, 1991–2020 *(in billions of current US dollars)* 22

Figure 3. Total cross-border resources by flow, 1991–2020 *(in billions of current US dollars)*. 23

Figure 4. Total cross-border resources by flow and by country, 2020 *(in millions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)*. 24

Figure 5. Total cross-border resources as a percentage of gross national income by flow and by country, 2020 25

Figure 6. Official and private foreign assistance by country, 2020 *(in millions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)* 26

Figure 7. Official and private foreign assistance as a percentage of gross national income by country, 2020 27

Figure 8. Philanthropic outflows as a percentage of gross national income in 47 countries, 2020 28

Figure 9. Philanthropic outflows from low-income and lower-middle income countries, 2020 33

Figure 10. Philanthropic outflows from upper-middle income countries, 2020 34

Figure 11. Philanthropic outflows from high-income countries, 2020 35

Figure 12. Net official development assistance by country, 2020 *(in millions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)* 52

Figure 13. Net official development assistance as a share of gross national income by country, 2020 54

Figure 14. Remittance outflows to all countries by sending country, 2020 *(in millions of US dollars)* 56

Figure 15. Remittance outflows to all countries as a percentage of gross national income by sending country, 2020 57

Figure 16. Remittance outflows to low- and middle- income countries by top 10 sending countries across income groups, 2020 *(in millions of US dollars)* 58

Figure 17. Remittance outflows to low- and middle- income countries as a percentage of gross national income by top 10 sending countries across income groups, 2020 58

Figure 18. Private capital flows by country, 2020 *(in millions of US dollars)* 62

Figure 19. Private capital flows as a percentage of gross national income by country, 2020 63

Tables

Table 1. World Bank country income classification, 2020. 10

Table 2. Basic facts of countries covered in the 2023 GPT, 2020 11

Table 3. Total cross-border resources from 47 countries by flow, 2018 and 2020 *(in billions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)* 22

Table 4. Data on cross-border philanthropic outflows by top charitable cause 38

Table 5. Data on cross-border philanthropic outflows by top recipient region. 42

Table 6. Data availability on cross-border volunteering by country 47

Introduction

The *Global Philanthropy Tracker (GPT)* is a first-of-its-kind research effort to measure cross-border donations from individuals and organizations around the world. The *2023 GPT*, the 11th edition of the index, bridges the gap between an increasing need for philanthropy and the lack of knowledge about the scope of cross-border giving. Findings presented in this report are based on philanthropic outflows from 47 countries in 2020, or the most recently available year, as well as three externally tracked resource flows: official development assistance (ODA), remittances, and private capital investment (PCI). By reporting on these flows, the *GPT* demonstrates how civil societies, governments, businesses, and individuals collaborate to address societal issues around the globe.

The 47 countries included in the report contributed USD 70 billion in philanthropic outflows in 2020, showing that despite the negative economic, health, and social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic, philanthropy was a resilient cross-border resource flow. The other two private cross-border resource flows were more altered by global crises. Specifically, while remittances saw a large increase in 2020 as migrants sent more money back home to support their families during the pandemic, PCI suffered from a severe decline as the global economy was hit hard.

The global challenges of 2020, from social injustice to the COVID-19 pandemic and climate disasters, put the philanthropic sector to the test and provided an opportunity to reconceptualize the role of philanthropy in foreign aid and sustainable development. For example, the health crisis inspired generosity worldwide as people mobilized to help others in need. Technology-enabled forms of giving like crowdfunding, crypto donations, and mobile giving offered instant and contact-free ways for people to support others despite lockdowns (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2022). International organizations initiated funds to combat the pandemic, such as the World Health Organization's (WHO) COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund, which raised over USD 256 million

from nearly 680,000 individuals and organizations around the world between March 2020 and December 2021 (WHO, 2021).

Philanthropy serves as an innovator, promoter, and cross-sector collaborator at the local and global level, yet the findings of the *2023 GPT* indicate that there are avenues for improvement. Based on the findings of this report, the *2023 GPT* suggests: the **enhancement of local philanthropic ecosystems through regional collaborations**, the establishment of mechanisms to **mobilize local philanthropy in addressing global challenges**, and the development of **international standards for data tracking and the promotion of data transparency** on specific issue areas, especially climate and racial justice. Leveraging the lessons from 2020 will determine the success of our responses to current and future global issues.



Key Findings

The 47 countries covered in the *2023 GPT* have varying levels of economic development and represent every world region. Together, they accounted for 22 percent of all countries and economies worldwide, 61 percent of the global population, and 85 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP) in 2020.

47 countries


at all stages of economic development

USD 70 billion

in cross-border philanthropic outflows in 2020

8 percent

of worldwide cross-border resources



Compared with 2018, the total amount of the four cross-border resource flows from the 47 countries declined slightly by 2 percent in 2020.



+19%
Remittances



-1%
Official Development Assistance (ODA)



-0.5%
Philanthropic Outflows



-100%
Private Capital Investment

THE LANDSCAPE OF CROSS-BORDER PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS AMONG 47 COUNTRIES

1. In 2020, these 47 countries contributed USD 70 billion in philanthropic outflows,¹ and USD 841 billion when adding together all four cross-border resource flows—philanthropic outflows as well as ODA, individual remittances, and PCI (see Figure 1). Philanthropic outflows represent 8 percent of the total cross-border resources.

2. In 2020, of the 47 countries, the five in the low-income and lower-middle income groups donated a total of USD 42 million to other countries (see Figure 9); the 10 upper-middle income countries contributed around USD 644 million (see Figure 10); and the 32 high-income countries contributed nearly USD 70 billion (see Figure 11) of cross-border philanthropy.

¹ The data on philanthropic outflows from the 47 countries included in this report vary in terms of data quality. The data discussed in this report, therefore, may underestimate the true scope of philanthropic outflows in some cases.

CHANGES IN PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS SINCE 2018

3. The combined level of cross-border philanthropic outflows and the other three resource flows from the 47 countries declined slightly by 2 percent when adjusted for inflation, from USD 859 billion² in 2018 to USD 841 billion in 2020 (see Table 3).

- Philanthropy proved to be resilient during the year 2020, with only a small decline of 0.5 percent from USD 71 billion in 2018. About 60 percent of the 47 countries had updated data that are directly comparable to the amount in 2018. Among this subgroup of countries, philanthropic outflows went up modestly by around 4 percent, though the change varied greatly by country.
- ODA remained at a similar level in 2018 and 2020, dropping by only 1 percent.
- Remittances saw the largest increase and remained the largest flow, growing by 19 percent between 2018 and 2020, from USD 496 billion to USD 590 billion. This can be attributed to their counter-cyclical nature, to stimulus packages from host-country governments leading to favorable economic conditions, as well as to movements toward digital and formal ways of money transfer that could be tracked by governments due to COVID-19 restrictions which increased the visibility of previously un-tracked remittances, and fluctuations in oil prices and exchanges rates (Kpodar et al., 2022).
- PCI showed a drastic decline from USD 112 billion in 2018 to USD 0.4 billion in 2020. This is due to the combined effects of the global economic recession, a depreciation in the value of investments, and reduced levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) on private capital flows (UNCTAD, 2021).

CROSS-BORDER PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS BY CAUSE AND RECIPIENT REGION

4. Education and health remained the top two most supported charitable causes, as in 2018, each receiving cross-border donations from 9 countries in 2020, based on a subgroup of 14 countries with available data. These causes directly align with UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 4 and 3 (Quality Education and Global Health and Well-Being, respectively). Most countries with available data did not detail how their causes aligned with the SDGs, and only a portion of those causes could be categorized within the SDG framework.

5. Africa was the region cited most frequently as a top recipient of philanthropic support, according to countries that reported data on this matter. Among the subgroup of countries that reported data on recipient countries or regions, 15 cited Africa, 9 cited Asia, and 9 cited Europe. Compared with 2018, Africa and Asia remained the top two regions supported by cross-border philanthropy, while the number of countries that gave to Europe increased in 2020.

THE FUTURE OF CROSS-BORDER PHILANTHROPY

6. Technological innovations and innovative ways of giving have the potential to revolutionize cross-border philanthropy. The proliferation of emerging giving vehicles, such as crowdfunding, crypto donations, and collaborative global funds have facilitated and accelerated both local and global philanthropy during the COVID-19 pandemic.

7. The findings emphasize the need for increased collaboration between countries, sectors, and philanthropic actors, and highlight the importance of improved data collection on new areas of giving, a better reporting structure to capture giving that supports the SDGs, and more intentional data tracking efforts to enhance diversity, equity, and inclusion in global giving.

8. Cross-border philanthropy can be bolstered by highlighting and utilizing the expertise and dedication of diaspora communities who, especially during times of crisis, rally and provide targeted and informed philanthropic relief to their home countries.

TABLE 3. TOTAL CROSS-BORDER RESOURCES FROM 47 COUNTRIES BY FLOW, 2018 AND 2020 (in billions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)

Financial Flows from 47 Countries	2020	2018	% Change from 2018 to 2020
REMITTANCES	\$590	\$496	19%
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)	\$180	\$181	-1%
PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS	\$70	\$71	-0.5%
PRIVATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT (PCI)	\$0.4	\$112	-100%
TOTAL	\$841	\$859	-2%

² In this report, all currencies were adjusted into 2020 USD values.

Suggestions

The 2023 GPT identifies three opportunities for the international community to bolster the role of philanthropy in sustainable development. By leveraging the lessons learned, leaders can respond appropriately to current and future challenges.



Enhance Local Philanthropic Ecosystems Through Regional Collaborations

The increasing number of natural and human-made disasters highlights the need for an improved ecosystem for cross-border philanthropy, especially through local grassroots organizations and their leadership, which are often the first responders in times of crisis. With regional collaborations, philanthropic organizations³ have the potential to advance the local and global philanthropic ecosystem with knowledge sharing, local capacity building, and advocacy work. These organizations could also facilitate the connections and communication between international donors and local philanthropic organizations to enhance equity and cultural awareness in cross-border philanthropy. Numerous regional and international collaborations can serve as examples for good practices, some of which are highlighted below.

- In the Asia-Pacific region, several regional-level centers and nonprofit associations, such as the Centre for Asian Philanthropy and Society and the Asia Philanthropy Circle, aim to enhance the philanthropic environment in the region, including cross-border giving. The report on *Unlocking Cross-border Philanthropy in Asia* published by Give2Asia highlights that it is crucial to create a more cohesive ecosystem for cross-border philanthropy in this region by cultivating a regionally focused giving mindset, establishing trustworthy intermediary organizations, and advocating for an enabling environment for cross-border philanthropy, which would create a more cohesive ecosystem for cross-border philanthropy (Tran & Thai, 2022).

- Although the non-discriminatory principle should allow cross-border philanthropy in the European Union (EU) (European Union, 2017), the comparability procedures and different tax regulations implemented by each member states have historically hindered cross-border philanthropy among the 27 member states. In order to facilitate cross-border giving, the Transnational Giving Europe network provides solutions for tax-effective cross-border cash donations in 19 European countries (Transnational Giving Europe, 2023). Since 2021, the Philanthropy Europe Association (Philea) nurtures the philanthropic ecosystem in over 30 European countries by knowledge sharing, networking, and advocacy work (Philea, 2023).

The increasing number of natural and man-made disasters and crises highlights the need for an improved ecosystem for cross-border philanthropy and the enhancement of local philanthropic organizations. Regional collaborations have the potential to strengthen the local and global philanthropic ecosystem with knowledge sharing, local capacity building, and advocacy work. Some of these organizations could also support donors navigate the regulatory and administrative requirements of foreign donations by providing official guidelines and alternative channels for cross-border giving. These organizations could also enhance equity in cross-border philanthropy by facilitating the connections and communication between international donors and local philanthropic organizations. All these steps are necessary to create a more effective environment for and enhance equity in cross-border philanthropy.

³ “The term Philanthropic Organization (PO) refers to a form of non-market, non-state organizations outside of the family that provide services for the public good. It includes the following: foundations (grant-making, operating, corporate, community, or government sponsored/created), community-based organizations and village associations, professional associations, environmental groups, advocacy groups, co-operatives, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, mutual entities, labor unions, societies, research institutes, diasporic organizations, online social-purpose portals, transnational and cross-sectoral coalitions, and other types of non-governmental organizations that are relevant in a given country.”



Establish Mechanisms to Mobilize Local Philanthropy in Addressing Global Challenges

During the COVID-19 pandemic, several innovative initiatives proactively cultivated a more enabling environment when traditional channels of sending and receiving cross-border philanthropy became more challenging, a finding that is reinforced in the *2022 Global Philanthropy Environment Index* (Indiana University Lilly family School of Philanthropy, 2022).⁴

- During the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, individual donors were unable to support the global work of the World Health Organization (WHO). Thus, in partnership with the United Nations Foundation and the Swiss Philanthropy Foundation, WHO established the COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund to raise funds from individuals, companies, and philanthropies across the world for the first time in its history (WHO, 2020). This initiative not only helped raise funds for the global work of WHO but also raised awareness of the importance of possible new ways of global giving.

Philanthropic organizations could implement novel ways of giving to reinforce local philanthropy and provide more equitable, localized funding. Additionally, local, regional, and global philanthropic actors could support donors navigating the regulatory and administrative requirements of foreign donations by providing official guidelines and best practices for cross-border giving.



Develop International Standards for Data Tracking and Promote Data Transparency

There is a dearth of data on cross-border giving to specific causes, such as giving to fight climate change or racial injustice and inequity. Concerns related to climate change have become increasingly relevant and necessary in the past few decades, and racial justice and racial equity are long-standing global concerns, caused by pervasive and systemic racism, colonialism, and xenophobia.

Based on a scan of 81 countries and economies, this report shares data on cross-border giving from 47 countries where it was possible to get basic estimates on cross-border philanthropy, and only 14 countries had available data on cross-border giving by charitable cause.

- There is a general lack of data on cross-border giving to specific causes (e.g., climate change, racial injustice). Capturing the magnitude of giving to these relatively new and emerging causes is still challenging, but several research centers and data providers have already started revising their methodologies to focus on collecting and providing such data to the public (Candid, n.d.; ClimateWorks Foundation, 2022; Philanthropic Initiative for Racial Equity, 2019).
- Data on giving to the SDGs is also scarce, leading to limited information on philanthropic contributions to development. To facilitate the usage of the SDG language and encourage SDG data collection and reporting for philanthropic organizations, the SDG Philanthropy Platform created the “SDG Indicator Wizard” to translate and align an organization’s achievements and goals into the language of the SDGs. Recently, several international organizations and data providers have aimed to provide better information on giving to the SDGs at the regional and global levels (SDG Funders, n.d.; Arab Foundations Forum, 2023; East Africa Philanthropy Network, 2022).

This significant lack of public data presents an ongoing challenge to fully understanding the patterns and trends of cross-border generosity. It also limits our understanding of the role that philanthropy plays globally, especially during global crises like the COVID-19 pandemic, when all sectors are called upon to respond. Promoting data sharing and transparency, building infrastructure for systematic data collection, and establishing international standards for data reporting could help improve data availability and quality in the long term and support individual and institutional donors to make informed, data-driven decisions.

⁴ Published by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, the *Global Philanthropy Environment Index* examines the enabling environment for philanthropy within a country and across countries. For more information, visit <https://globalindices.iupui.edu/index.html>.

What Does the Report Measure?

The *Global Philanthropy Tracker (GPT)* measures the extent of global cross-border philanthropic outflows of 47 countries. By focusing on all cross-border philanthropy—not just philanthropy for development purposes—it offers a holistic view of the philanthropic outflows. It further compares cross-border philanthropy to three other resource flows: ODA, remittances, and PCI. This section provides a definition of these four resources flows as well as an overview of the 47 countries included in the report.

PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS

The concept of ‘philanthropy’ has evolved over time and varies across cultures, but today it is generally seen as using any type of private resources, such as money, time, specific talents, and collective action, for the public good (Phillips & Jung, 2016).

Philanthropic outflows refer to: a) the sum of charitable financial contributions sent by donors when the donor (individuals, corporations, foundations, or other grantmaking organizations) and the beneficiary (individuals, philanthropic organizations, or intermediary organizations) are located in different countries; or b) giving within a country to domestic philanthropic organizations that focus on broad categories of international causes, such as foreign affairs, humanitarian assistance, international relations, promotion of international understanding, and international solidarity.

Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2020 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

Official Development Assistance (ODA) is government aid that “promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries” (OECD, n.d.-b). The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) definition includes:

[F]lows to countries and territories on the DAC [Development Assistance Committee] List of ODA Recipients and to multilateral development institutions which are provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies ... and each transaction of which is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and is concessional in character (OECD, n.d.-a).

Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2020 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

This broad definition covers assistance to many areas, such as economic infrastructure, government and civil society, and water supply and sanitation, as well as humanitarian aid. Nuclear energy is also reportable as ODA if it is for civilian purposes, and cultural programs also count if they increase the cultural capacity of the recipient countries. However, the current ODA guidelines exclude money in the form of military aid, peacekeeping expenditures, as well as deals with primarily commercial objectives. The statistics on ODA published by the OECD are also the sole verified, official numbers for the 31 DAC members and the 80 additional providers of aid, including non-DAC countries and organizations (OECD, n.d.-a).

REMITTANCES

Vital for economic development around the globe, remittances are transfers of money that take place when individuals send a part of their earnings to their families, friends, and relatives in their home country (Kretchmer, 2020). They can take the form of either cash or goods. Typically, the sender “pays the remittance to the sending agent using cash, check, money order, credit card, debit card, or a debit instruction sent through email, phone or the Internet. The sending agency instructs its agent in the recipient’s country to deliver the remittance. The paying agent makes the payment to the addressed beneficiary” (Ratha, 2020).

Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2020 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Remittances have a negative cyclical position with the migrant’s home country. This means that during economic crises or natural disasters in the home country, when private capital flows decrease, remittances from migrants actually increase (Frankel, 2010). This is often because the migrants themselves choose to cut their own living costs, cushioning the recipients of the remittances from economic downturns (Ratha, n.d.).

Globally, remittances increased between 2018 and 2019 by 4.6 percent, and rose slightly from USD 714 billion in 2019 to USD 719 billion in 2020 (0.6%) (Ratha et al., 2022). Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there were concerns that the size of remittances would decrease greatly, which would have had an outsized impact on countries which rely heavily on this “lifeline” (Sayeh and Chami, 2020). Yet, remittances remained resilient in 2020 due to a variety of factors, including stimulus packages from host-country governments which resulted in unexpectedly favorable economic conditions; movements away from cash and informal channels and towards digital and formal channels; and cyclical fluctuations of oil prices and exchanges rates (Kpodar et al., 2022). Additionally, weak oil prices negatively impacted countries that are part of the Gulf Cooperation Council, leading their rate of decline to be greater than non-oil dependent economies, though as a percent of GNI these countries remitted substantially (Ratha et al., 2021).

Private capital investment (PCI) refers to the purchase of a capital asset—whether physical or financial—that is expected to generate income as well as gradually increase in value over time. Physical capital includes assets such as land, buildings, equipment, and machinery, among others; financial capital includes assets such as venture capital, seed funding, or company shares (Koenig & Jackson, 2016). PCI measures certain financial flows at market terms financed out of private sector resources and private grants, including grants by non-government organizations. It can include private flows at market terms from changes in holdings of private long-term assets held by residents of the reporting country to the net of subsidies received from the official sector (OECD, 2023).

Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2020 Global Philanthropy Tracker

In international development, researchers have suggested that PCI inflows have become as important as ODA when financing an economy (Lee & Sami, 2019). For low-income countries that do not have significant natural resources, private capital inflows can be especially beneficial (Lee & Sami, 2019). Private investors and development finance institutions (DFIs) provide capital and risk protection for investors in lower-income countries around the world and contribute a notable share to international development. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, this involved

the collaboration of DFIs with the healthcare sectors in developing countries through financial assistance. Since 2020, some DFIs have begun to adopt an ESG-centered approach to financing, incorporating sustainability and health concerns into their investments as a way to promote sustainable development (Suzuki Motor Corporation, 2021). Private investment can provide developing countries with access to both international markets and technology. Additionally, it can bolster domestic policy coherence, which can also attract foreign direct investment (FDI). These impacts can have ripple effects, such as the integration of the domestic economy in international trade, better employment opportunities, enterprise development and competition, and general economic and social condition improvements nationally (OECD, 2002).

For the first time in history, the global total value of PCI was negative in 2020 (OECD, 2023). While PCI traditionally captures the outflow of private investment from high-income countries to lower income countries, the negative value signifies that there was a net capital inflow to richer countries in 2020. This negative value reflects the combined effects of the global economic recession, a depreciation in the value of investments, and reduced levels of FDI on private capital flows (UNCTAD, 2021). Flows of so-called Greenfield FDI—that is, corporate expansions abroad—into developing and emerging markets were already in decline since 2018, and the lockdowns and economic recession in 2020 caused another sharp fall in this type of FDI, which contributed to lowering overall private outflows (Koçak & Barış-Tüzemen, 2022).

WHAT IS COVERED IN THE REPORT

The *2023 GPT* shares updated estimates of the philanthropic outflows from 47 countries in 2020 or the most recent year for which data are available. Country-level data are presented by countries' income group as defined by the World Bank using gross national income (GNI) per capita. GNI per capita is a useful indicator that is closely related to other commonly-used nonmonetary measures of the quality of life, such as child mortality, life expectancy, and school enrollment.⁵ Presenting country-level data by income group provides a useful framework to understand philanthropic outflows and the other three major cross-border resource flows—ODA, individual remittances, and PCI—in the context of living standards in these 47 countries. Based on GNI per capita, the World Bank classifies countries into four income groups: low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high (as shown in Table 1).

TABLE 1. WORLD BANK COUNTRY INCOME CLASSIFICATION, 2020

<i>World Bank Country Income Group</i>	<i>Gross National Income (GNI) Per Capita (in US dollars)</i>
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES	\$1,045 OR LESS
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES	BETWEEN \$1,046 AND \$4,095
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES	BETWEEN \$4,096 AND \$12,695
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES	ABOVE \$12,695

Source: World Bank, World Bank Country and Lending Groups

The 47 countries that are covered in the *2023 GPT* were at different stages of economic development. Around two-thirds are high-income countries. Fourteen countries are categorized as emerging markets by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI).⁶ All world regions are represented by these 47 countries, more than two-fifths (43%) of which are in Europe. Additionally, 26 of the 31 OECD DAC members are included.⁷ Table 2 presents some basic facts of these countries by the World Bank income classification.

- The only low-income country that is included in the *2023 GPT*⁸—Uganda—represented 4 percent of all 27 countries in this income group, roughly 1 percent of the world population, and 0.04 percent of global GDP in 2020. Its GNI per capita in 2020 was USD 804.
- Four lower-middle income countries are included in the *2023 GPT*. In 2020, these countries accounted for 7 percent of all 55 World Bank lower-middle income countries, 22 percent of the world population, and 4 percent of global GDP. Their average GNI per capita was USD 1,686 in 2020.

- Ten countries included in the *2023 GPT* were classified as upper-middle income. They accounted for less than one-fifth (18%) of all 55 countries in this income group. These countries represented 24 percent of the world population and 22 percent of global GDP in 2020. Their average GNI per capita was USD 7,063 in 2020.
- Thirty-two high-income countries are included. They represented 40 percent of all 80 countries in this income group, and over two-thirds (68%) of all countries covered in the *2023 GPT*. These 32 countries were home to 14 percent of the global population and accounted for 60 percent of the world's GDP in 2020. Their average GNI per capita in 2020 was USD 41,536.

⁵ For more information on the use of GNI per capita in country classification by the World Bank, see <https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/378831-why-use-gni-per-capita-to-classify-economies-into>

⁶ See [Appendix C](#) for the list of MSCI emerging economies included in the report. For details on the MSCI annual market classification, visit <https://www.msci.com/market-classification>.

⁷ See [Appendix C](#) for the list of DAC member countries included in the report. For details on the DAC classification, visit <http://www.oecd.org/dac/development-assistance-committee>.

⁸ Tanzania was the other low-income country included in the 2020 *GPT*. Its classification has been adjusted from low-income to lower-middle income since 2019. That is where Tanzania is included in this 2023 report.

TABLE 2. BASIC FACTS OF COUNTRIES COVERED IN THE 2023 GPT, 2020

<i>Countries Covered in the 2023 GPT by World Bank Country Income Group</i>	<i>Number of Countries Covered</i>	<i>Percentage of Countries by Income Group</i>	<i>Percentage of World Population</i>	<i>Percentage of Global GDP</i>	<i>Average GNI Per Capita (in US dollars)</i>
LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES	1	4%	1%	0.04%	\$804
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES	4	7%	22%	4%	\$1,686
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES	10	18%	24%	22%	\$7,063
HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES	32	40%	14%	60%	\$41,536
ALL GPT COUNTRIES	47	22%	61%	85%	\$29,943

Source: World Bank

Notes: List of countries included in the 2023 GPT by the World Bank country income group

- Low-income countries: Uganda;
- Lower-middle income countries: India, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania;
- Upper-middle income countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, China, Mexico, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, South Africa, and Türkiye;
- High-income countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the Slovak Republic, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

History of the Global Philanthropy Tracker

The 2023 GPT is the 11th edition of the report. It is a continuation of the 2020 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*, published by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, and the *Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances*, initiated and conducted by the Center for Global Prosperity at the Hudson Institute. First published in 2006, the report provides comprehensive information on international philanthropy from developed and emerging economies to developing countries for development purposes. It documents the magnitude of cross-border financial flows from public and private sources. The report was among the first comprehensive research endeavors to present a more complete picture of the total economic engagement with developing countries through ODA, philanthropic giving, remittances, and PCI.

Starting from the 2020 GPT, the report introduces a more inclusive approach and expands the scope of the philanthropic outflows to include contributions made to all countries in support of all charitable causes, when data are available. It captures charitable contributions from private sources, including individuals, corporations, foundations, and a wide range of other philanthropic organizations (POs). This series of reports provides unique baseline data on cross-border philanthropy for future research and serves as a useful tool for practitioners and policy makers in philanthropy and international development.

Data in Context: Setting the Stage

To contextualize the state of cross-border philanthropy during 2020, the year for which most countries provided data, it is important to review some of the major global and regional events that occurred in 2019 and 2020 which have inspired cross-border collaborations and global philanthropic giving. During 2019 and 2020, ongoing humanitarian crises were exacerbated by regional and global health crises as well as natural, humanitarian, political, and social crises. These events required the power of global giving which made the role and responsibilities of global philanthropy more prominent.

Philanthropy emerged in a variety of ways in reaction to these events: from global advocacy for racial justice and climate, to unprecedented crowdfunding campaigns and fundraising activities to fight against the COVID-19 global pandemic or to rebuild the Notre-Dame cathedral in Paris, to international collaboration, aid, and volunteering to provide relief and recovery to natural disasters and catastrophes, such as the massive explosion in Beirut, Lebanon or the fire seasons in Australia and the United States, just to mention some of them. Global philanthropy have proved that it can provide quick

support, if needed: WHO's COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund collected over USD 70 million by more than 187,000 individuals and organizations for the first time of the organization's history (WHO, 2020a); the global philanthropic responses to the massive explosion in Beirut, Lebanon reached a total of USD 1.4 million for relief and recovery (Sato, 2022); and less than 48 hours after the Notre-Dame fire, nearly USD 1 billion was pledged by high-net-worth individuals, companies, and everyday donors to support restoration and rebuilding efforts (Nugent, 2019).

Key Global Events*

2020

2019

Global Health Crises



On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization characterized the **COVID-19 outbreak** as a pandemic (WHO, n.d.). By the end of 2020, almost every country of the world was affected by it. At the global level more than 84 million COVID-19 cases were recorded and nearly 2 million people died (Al Jazeera, 2020; Worldometer, 2023).

Amid the ongoing civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the World Health Organization declared a public health emergency after a widespread **Ebola outbreak** in July.

In Yemen, a lack of basic services like water and sanitation contributed to a **cholera outbreak** that led to an increasing rate of famine and child malnutrition in the country (Huber, 2019).

Racism and Racial Justice



The **Black Lives Matter movement** spread across the globe after the killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, the United States in June 2020. Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States witnessed some of the largest Black Lives Matter protests across the more than 50 countries that reported such protests (Gunia et al., 2021).

Racial justice movements exist across the globe: Colombians have stood up for the rights of Afro-Latinos; in Indonesia, #AllPapuanLivesMatter went viral while campaigning for minority rights, and in South Africa, activists launched the Colored Lives Matter movement in 2020 (Westerman, 2020).

Peaceful protests in Hong Kong to support the Uyghur population in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region of Western China, who were being subjected to forced indoctrination into Chinese culture and society (Haas, 2019), were forcibly stopped by police (Reuters, 2019).

Hate crimes rooted in **racism and xenophobia** occurred as well. In Germany, there was a shooting at a synagogue in Halle and the murder of the mayor of Kassel by a far-right extremist (Keesi, 2020). In Christchurch, New Zealand, a white supremacist and terrorist massacred 51 Muslim worshippers from two mosques as they gathered for Friday prayers (Perry, 2021).

Natural Disasters



Lethal heat caused the most deaths of any disaster in 2020 apart from the COVID-19 pandemic. Europe faced another summer of deadly heat waves, causing the deaths of 6,340 people in Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (UNDRR & CRED, 2021).

Record-breaking fire seasons burned 13 million acres in Australia (Sullivan, 2020) and more than 5 million acres in the Western United States (Migliozzi et al., 2020).

The **hurricane** season wreaked destruction across the globe, from Cyclone Amphan in India and Bangladesh in May to Hurricane Eta in Central America and Typhoon Vamco in the Philippines in November (Hubbard, 2020).

The **eruption of the Taal Volcano** blanketed the Philippines in ash for weeks, causing the evacuation of 300,000 people and killing nearly 40 people.

An **infestation of desert locusts**, a destructive migratory pest that feeds on food crops and grasses, impacted 23 countries in East Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia (World Bank, 2020a). In some countries the swarms were the worst outbreak in over two decades (Omer, 2020).

In March 2019, **Cyclone Idai** struck Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Malawi, and in April, Cyclone Kenneth hit an area of Mozambique spared by Cyclone Idai. The cyclones killed more than a thousand people and caused flooding that affected more than two million people, and led to a national food crisis (Huber, 2019).

In August, more than 26,000 **fires** burned in the Amazon rainforest, the highest number of recorded fires since 2010 (Symonds, 2019).

In December, after a **volcano erupted** on an island in New Zealand, 16 people died and several others were injured as gas and ashes continued to spread throughout the island (History.com Editors, 2020).

Multiple countries were affected by **earthquakes** as well. Puerto Rico was the center of an “earthquake swarm” in December 2019 through January 2020, where the thousands of aftershocks impeded relief efforts (Sato, 2022). Türkiye and Greece were also the centers of multiple strong earthquakes in 2020, killing more than 150 people and displacing thousands of others in January and November 2020 (Hubbard, 2020).

Refugee and Migration Crises



Various **refugee and food crises** continued into 2020, including the Syrian, Rohingya, and Venezuelan refugee crises as well as the civil war and food crises in Yemen (Omer, 2020). While these crises have caused humanitarian emergencies for multiple years, the number of people requiring immediate aid increased.

An escalation of conflict displaced almost a million people in Syria, worsening the **displacement and refugee crisis** (Omer 2020).

Thousands of people also fled Venezuela during the ongoing economic crisis, while in Malaysia the Rohingya refugee crisis worsened due to the monsoon season, which flooded several refugee camps (Huber, 2019).

Other Major Disasters



On August 4, Lebanon experienced one of the **biggest non-nuclear explosions** in history after a warehouse containing explosive ammonium nitrate detonated in the capital. The detonation killed nearly 220 people, injured over 6,000 others, and more than 70 percent of buildings in Beirut were affected by the explosion (Sato, 2022).

A **devastating fire** at Paris’ Notre-Dame cathedral led to one of the biggest global philanthropic responses of 2019. Notre-Dame de Paris caught fire on April 15, 2019, drawing global attention as it burned (Nugent, 2019).

*This list only provides key examples of major global events around the world in 2019 and 2020, and does not comprehensively cover all important global events that occurred.

Spotlight on Giving to Ukraine

Philanthropy has been an important part of Ukrainian society even before the beginning of the Russian invasion in February 2022. Following the Maidan Revolution in 2014, the culture of widespread giving changed significantly, showing that the public was capable of funding both focused initiatives as well as larger-scale projects (EUDiF & Shakaba, 2021). In 2020, a report from the Razumkov Centre (2020) noted that the level of trust in volunteer activity for philanthropic organizations was relatively high (61%), almost as high as trust in the army or churches (66% and 62% respectively). Trust in other forms of philanthropic organizations was somewhat lower at 43 percent, but still significantly higher than the judiciary or political parties, which hover around 12-15 percent.

As of 2021, 67 percent of Ukrainians had participated in some sort of philanthropic activity, both on an ad-hoc and regular basis (Zagoriy Foundation, 2021). Charitable giving is also perceived as having a positive influence on society. However, lack of formal regulation and interaction with stakeholders hampered the sector to some extent (Zagoriy Foundation & WINGS, 2022). Since February 2022, the extent of philanthropy has noticeably increased. The Zagoriy Foundation maintains an index on the prevalence of philanthropy, ranked from 0-10 for low prevalence to high prevalence, respectively (Zagoriy Foundation, 2022a).⁹ According to the study, the prevalence of philanthropy increased from 4.5 in 2021 to 7.8 in 2022 (Zagoriy Foundation, 2022a). This expansion is also being noticed by society at large, with 84 percent of respondents perceiving that philanthropy significantly or somewhat increased since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine starting in February 2022 has provided more need for Ukrainians to use philanthropic tools to face critical challenges, and brought a flood of international support into the Ukrainian philanthropic sector.

Ukraine was already well-situated to receive these donations since the country's regulatory structure is very favorable to receiving cross-border donations, exempting in-kind donations from customs and value added tax, and exempting cash donations from being taxed as income (Vinnikov, 2022). According to Candid (2023), almost USD 1.6 billion in grants has been made available to Ukraine, as well as USD 1.2 billion in pledges. In addition, organizations also came up with specific projects to help aid those affected by the war. One example is Airbnb, which announced that it aimed to provide 100,000 Ukrainians with housing following the initial attack, and by March 2022 had already found 30,000 hosts willing to help refugees (Roach, 2022).

⁹ The survey was conducted via structured interviews with 1,605 respondents contacted between June 29 and July 6, 2022, chosen through random generation of mobile phone numbers (Zagoriy Foundation, 2022a).



CHARITABLE CROWDFUNDING

This sharp and rapid upsurge in support to Ukraine can partially be attributed to the extent of crowdfunding campaigns for the country. The Ukrainian government itself has helped amplify these projects and created its own funding page through the Bank of Ukraine, and this platform has allowed for direct transfers and payments in multiple currencies to streamline the process and lower fees for donors. As of January 2, 2023, UAH 920 million was donated for humanitarian needs through this channel (National Bank of Ukraine, 2023). Many campaigns have been established to address specific issues throughout the country. For example, Ukraine's second-largest city Kharkiv has suffered immense destruction since February 2022. *HelpKharkiv* is an online fundraising campaign started by local IT companies to support 42 local organizations to provide medicine, food, basic supplies, and shelter for those in the city in need of help (Help Kharkiv, 2022). Another campaign, called Unbroken, supports the First Medical Association of Lviv, which treats wounded Ukrainians. It established the National Rehabilitation Center to assist in the treatment of injured people, including providing around 2,500 hospital beds and completing over 10,000 medical operations (Unbroken, 2023). Other organizations have a more established relationship with Ukraine, such as Nova Ukraine. This organization was founded following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, and to date has delivered USD 63.5 million in relief, with first aid, food and basic needs, and medical equipment making up around 60 percent (Nova Ukraine, 2023).

CRYPTO DONATIONS

Ukraine has also embraced newer vehicles for philanthropic giving, such as using cryptocurrency to receive donations. On February 26, 2022, two days after the Russian invasion began, the official Twitter page for Ukraine announced that donations of Bitcoin, Ethereum, and USDT would be accepted. The accounts received over USD 54 million in cryptocurrency donations, with roughly two-thirds of the donations being made in Bitcoin or Ethereum (Elliptic, 2022). However, the Ukrainians were not the only ones accepting cryptocurrency donations. The UNHCR accepts a variety of cryptocurrencies for their donations to Ukrainian families (UNHCR, 2023). In total, the amount of cryptocurrency donations had reached around USD 70 million by late February 2023, with the majority being sent between March and August 2022 (Lindrea, 2023). However, recent upheaval in the cryptocurrency market has raised questions about this vehicle as a future source of secure donations. Karolina Lindholm Billing, the

UNHCR representative to Ukraine, argued that their program avoided exposing recipients to these areas of the market by using USDC, a more stable coin, and that the speed of cryptocurrency transfer made them an ideal mechanism for getting refugees needed support as quickly as possible (Verma, 2022).

MILLION-DOLLAR GIFTS

Individuals, foundations, charities, and corporations quickly responded to calls for humanitarian aid to Ukraine since Russia's invasion in February 2022. The Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy examined charitable donations toward Ukraine from February 24 to August 31, 2022. Specifically, data on large-scale donations of USD 1 million or more made by individuals, corporations, foundations, and charities worldwide were collected from public announcements and other publicly accessible and sources, which were primarily in English. Both cash and in-kind donations were included in the data collection, and pledged donations were excluded. The analyses below provide an overview of these philanthropic donations and shed light on who donated, how much has been donated, and where the donations went.

From February 24 to August 31, 2022, we identified 175 publicly announced gifts of at least USD 1 million for Ukraine, totaling USD 912.7 million. In terms of donor type, corporations and corporate foundations provided the highest percentage of giving, with 48 percent of the total amount, followed by individuals (18%) and foundations (11%). Cash gifts were the most popular type, which comprised 86 percent of all gifts and 77 percent of the charitable dollars. There were three large donations made via cryptocurrency, totaling USD 4.8 million (1% of the total). When it comes to the donor's region, Europe provided the most overall donations, with over USD 377 million (41% of the total). American individuals made 88 donations, which were half of all gifts identified, totaling USD 317 million (35% of the total). A large donation of USD 103.5 million (11% of the total amount) was the result of Russian journalist Dmitry Muratov, who auctioned off his Nobel Peace Prize for child refugees from Ukraine (Calvan, 2022). He received the Nobel in 2021, along with journalist Maria Ressa, for preserving freedom of speech in the face of attacks by their own governments and others. Donors from the Netherlands contributed USD 95 million (10% of the total), about 70 percent of which came from Nationale Postcode Loterij (Dutch Postcode Lottery).

The Rinat Akhmetov Foundation, FC Shakhtar, and the System Capital Management (SCM) businesses donated a combined USD 72 million for the Ukrainian military, defense, and individuals impacted by the war (Interfax Ukraine, 2022). Donors from other countries contributed the remaining 36 percent of the total charitable dollars.

Of the recipients of gifts of 1 million US dollars or more, UN agencies and international NGOs received 67 percent of the total. UN agencies (mostly UNICEF and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees) received 29 percent of the overall charitable dollars, and international organizations received 16 percent. A combination of UN agencies and international organizations received another 22 percent, but the specific amount donated to each was not disclosed publicly. Other recipients include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, and national societies, including the Ukrainian Red Cross (9%). Ukrainian hospitals (4%), various crowdfunding campaigns (2%), and the Ukrainian government (2%). A vast majority of these donations were to provide humanitarian relief to people in Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees, such as food, water, medical services, hygiene kits, and emergency education supplies.

SUPPORT FOR REFUGEES

For those looking to help Ukrainians displaced and forced to leave the country, numerous options exist for donors to engage, particularly in countries with a high number of Ukrainian refugees, such as Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic. For example, the Polish government has established its own website for assisting refugees. Through it, refugees can find assistance and donors are given resources on how they can help, including through volunteer opportunities and providing accommodations (#PomagamUkraine, 2022). Volunteers were in high demand at refugee centers along the border, where donations of basic items such as food and clothing were distributed to Ukrainians (Farley, 2022).

In the Czech Republic, a website called Pomáhej Ukrajině [Help Ukraine] provides a similar central portal where refugees can also create profiles and submit requests for the specific assistance they need (Pomáhej Ukrajině, 2022). Local organizations also assist refugees at the train station, primarily with buying tickets or purchasing food and drinks.

Government organizations such as KACPU, the Regional Assistance Center for Help to Ukraine, were also present at Prague's main train station during the first five months; KACPU is standing by to provide assistance at the station upon request (Kubištová, 2022).

In Germany, a central website with phone application is offered by the Federal Ministry of the Interior.¹⁰ While the federal government is the main coordinating body, specific organizations and the 16 German states develop the actual programs to help the refugees. One main offering for the refugees were "welcome centers" in major German train stations, such as Berlin, Cologne, and Munich (RBB24, 2022). These centers were critical in successfully handling the influx of refugees, reaching 10,000 per day in Berlin alone. However, as the winter approached, many cities consolidated their refugees resources in order to adapt to both a reduced number of arriving refugees and the looming energy crisis (Neu, 2022).

Organized assistance on the perimeter of the Ukrainian border also emerged, offering a more cooperative approach. One example is Help People Leave Ukraine, a group of young people from several European countries who assisted refugee resettlement in Moldova, Poland, and Germany and helped raise money for train and bus fares. Over 1,500 individuals volunteered with the group, and they have helped over 4,000 refugees (Help People Leave Ukraine, 2022).

Finally, Telegram has become a powerful tool for ad-hoc groups to organize and communicate with Ukrainian refugees directly. It is one of most popular messaging apps in Europe and Central Asia besides WhatsApp and provides the unique and valuable tool of channel subscriptions, unlike WhatsApp, wherein users can receive mass, real-time updates and information from people or groups. Many welcome groups at train stations use Telegram to recruit volunteers and publish information about their work. In Germany, the federal government also provided a list of regional Telegram channels to help refugees connect with people in potential final destinations (Digital Volunteers, 2022). Other channels also exist to assist refugees with specific problems, such as legal issues (Support Ukraine Now, 2022a).

¹⁰ www.germany4ukraine.de

Opportunities and Challenges of Giving to Ukraine

By Liubov Rainchuk and Svitlana Bakhshaliieva from the Zagoriy Foundation

Since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24th, 2022, both domestic and international fundraising for Ukraine has increased, though the most common recipient sector varies between domestic and international donations. There are a variety of giving channels through which these donations are transferred to Ukrainian NGOs. Additionally, there are obstacles to local NGOs receiving these donations, specifically from abroad.

The most publicly recognized giving channels tend to be the most impactful. Thus, in the first days of the full-scale war, the public accounts of the National Bank of Ukraine to fund the army, infrastructure, and humanitarian needs attracted many donations both within Ukraine and from abroad (National Bank of Ukraine, 2022). Additionally, large well-known foundations that have ties with international donors and the Ukrainian diaspora have been able to communicate their needs and get critical support rapidly. The Come Back Alive Foundation provides competent assistance to the military (Come Back Alive, n.d.). Many of the funds it receives come from international individual donors and diaspora. Another example is Zaporuka Foundation, which supports children with cancer and their families (Zaporuka Foundation, n.d.). In the first weeks of the full-scale war, they managed to evacuate to Italy and provide many of their beneficiaries with medical treatment thanks to pre-established partnerships. The diaspora community has become an engine of cross-border donations by sending funds both to Ukraine- and foreign-based civil society organizations established by Ukrainians across the globe.



Another popular tool is Support Ukraine Now, a website that aggregates most of the necessary information on where to send donations (Support Ukraine Now, 2022b). It is now translated into 50+ languages and has a list of well-trusted international and local organizations to which one can donate. Moreover, it lists the other ways to support Ukraine from abroad, such as volunteering, information support, and hosting refugees. In addition, the initiative of the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, UNITED24 has become one of the prominent channels for collecting charitable donations in support of Ukraine (UNITED24, 2022). Thanks to the informational support from the government and the large network of ambassadors, it has attracted more than USD 248 million as of December 21, 2022.

When examining domestic and international donations, it is important to distinguish support for the military from support for humanitarian needs. The Zagoriy Foundation conducted the “Charity in times of war” study from June 29th-July 6th 2022; they utilized the CATI method to conduct standardized interviews of a random sample of 1,605 residents in Ukraine who were 18 years of age or older (Zagoriy Foundation, 2022a). According to the study, most (86.5%) of surveyed respondents in Ukraine donated to issues related to the army, such as providing the military with all the necessary means of protection, for example, body armor, treatment, training in tactical medicine, demining, etc.

Ukraine has also attracted a great amount of international support since the beginning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The most popular areas of international help are humanitarian aid, support for the media, democracy, and civil society. However, it is important to evaluate how these funds are distributed and spent. Humanitarian issues tend to attract less attention inside Ukraine and more support from abroad, but this is mostly relevant for large NGOs because small and medium-sized organizations struggle to receive donations from abroad due to a lack of awareness and communication. Namely, there is a language barrier and a lack of experience in international partnerships. The majority of humanitarian aid coming from international organizations and institutions goes toward large international NGOs with offices in Ukraine, leaving national Ukrainian NGOs behind. Thus, large NGOs and those that have established international connections (through international fundraising platforms, partnerships, associations, grant history, etc.) are the main recipients of foreign funds. According to the UN Financial Tracking Service, as of May 20th 2022, national NGOs received only 0.003 percent of the total Ukraine humanitarian aid funding. The process of redistribution of funds is usually too slow to operate effectively (United Kingdom Humanitarian Innovation Lab, 2022).

The survey conducted by Zagoriy Foundation in March 2022 of the local partners and grantees that work on the ground supports this fact: low accessibility of funds and difficult bureaucratic procedures do not allow many local NGOs to cover institutional costs, such as salaries and office rentals (Zagoriy Foundation, 2022b). For example, a survey in the fall of 2022 of local, national, and international organizations and individuals in Ukraine focused on humanitarian action reported that “duplicated international due diligence processes” delayed the transfer of funds to organizations in Ukraine (Harrison et al., 2022, p. 2). Another issue is the lack of understanding of the local context and the current needs by the international donors and large international NGOs who received humanitarian aid. The key to solving this issue is a close cooperation between international NGOs and local NGOs. Thus, there is a need for flexible funding procedures and localization of humanitarian aid.

Total Cross-Border Resource Flows

In total, the *2023 GPT* examines four types of financial outflows, all of which play important, interconnected roles in how countries and their citizens engage in the field of global development. These flows are cross-border philanthropic outflows (private foreign assistance that is charitable financial contributions of individuals, foundations, and corporations), ODA (official foreign aid provided by governments), remittances (contributions, financial or in-kind, that migrants send back to their families or communities), and private capital flows at market terms (direct and portfolio investments from companies into the developing world).

In June 2020, economists forecasted that the deepest global recession since World War II would occur in 2020 (World Bank, 2020b). The global economy declined by an annualized rate of 3.2 percent in 2020 (Congressional Research Service, 2021). The global real GDP experienced a sharp fall in 2020, by 4.4 percent. Due to the economic consequences of the pandemic, global unemployment increased to 6.6 percent in 2020 (UNSD, 2022); and global foreign direct investment inflows fell by 35 percent in 2020, impacted primarily by developed countries (UNCTAD, 2021). Thus, with the global growth of civil society and philanthropy, philanthropic contributions have become an integral source for community development, alongside ODA, remittances, and private capital flows.


A. Total Cross-Border Resource Flows

In 2020, the 47 countries included in this report contributed USD 841 billion in total via four resource flows (see Figure 1). The largest share came from remittances, accounting for 70 percent and reaching USD 590 billion.

ODA totaled USD 180 billion in 2020, representing about one-fifth (21%) of the overall amount. Philanthropy comprised 8 percent at USD 70 billion. With a turbulent year in 2020, PCI reached only USD 0.4 billion, or less than 0.1 percent of the total.

FIGURE 1. TOTAL CROSS-BORDER RESOURCES FROM 47 COUNTRIES BY FLOW, 2020 (in billions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)

Total Amount: USD 841 Billion



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, *2023 Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: ODA and PCI from OECD; Remittances from the World Bank; Philanthropic outflows from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.



Compared with 2018, the total amount of the four resource flows from the 47 countries declined slightly by 2 percent in 2020 (see Table 3). Adjusted for inflation, ODA and philanthropy both remained at a similar level in 2018 and 2020, each with a change of one percent or less. Remittances went up by 19 percent in 2020, which can be attributed to several factors, such as their counter-cyclical nature and

the fact that stimulus packages from host-country governments and emerging remittance sending channels resulted in favorable economic conditions for remittances (Kpodar et al., 2022). By contrast, PCI was hit hard by the COVID-19 pandemic and had a drastic decline from 2018 to 2020 due in large part to the global economic recession and a depreciation in the value of investments (UNCTAD, 2021).

TABLE 3. TOTAL CROSS-BORDER RESOURCES FROM 47 COUNTRIES BY FLOW, 2018 AND 2020 (in billions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)


Financial Flows from 47 Countries	2020	2018	% Change from 2018 to 2020
REMITTANCES	\$590	\$496	19%
OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)	\$180	\$181	-1%
PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS	\$70	\$71	-0.5%
PRIVATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT (PCI)	\$0.4	\$112	-100%
TOTAL	\$841	\$859	-2%

Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*, 2020 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

The combined amount of private cross-border resource flows—philanthropy, remittances, and PCI—has surpassed the amount of ODA since 1992. Private flows have increased steadily since then and contribute three-quarters or more of the total

cross-border resources each year since the mid-2000s, while roughly a quarter or less comes from ODA. To provide a comparison, Figure 2 displays all three private cross-border flows with ODA from 1991 to 2020.

FIGURE 2. TOTAL CROSS-BORDER PRIVATE RESOURCE FLOWS (PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS, REMITTANCES, AND PRIVATE CAPITAL INVESTMENT), COMPARED WITH OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, 1991–2020 (in billions of current US dollars)



Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Total Cross-Border Private Flows

Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*


Data: ODA and PCI from OECD; Remittances from the World Bank; Philanthropic outflows in 1991–2014 from Hudson Institute’s *The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances* (IGPAR), 2006–2016; Philanthropic outflows in 2018 and 2020 from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.

Note: Historical data on the four resource flows for each year reflect a different number of countries that had data available in that year; therefore, the trend in the graph does not necessarily present the trend over time and may underestimate the real scope of some flows in some countries in a given year. The dash line represents less complete data on cross-border private flows before 2004.

Figure 3 shows a breakdown of the four types of resource flows by year from 1991 to 2020. Government aid accounted for the largest share of cross-border resources for development before the mid-1990s. Since then, with the economic growth across countries, funding from private

sources, especially individual remittances, has gone up significantly. Moreover, with the global rise of civil society and the nonprofit sector, philanthropic contributions have also grown and become an integral source for international aid and development.

FIGURE 3. TOTAL CROSS-BORDER RESOURCES BY FLOW, 1991–2020 (in billions of current US dollars)



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: ODA and PCI from OECD; Remittances from the World Bank; Philanthropic outflows in 1991–2014 from Hudson Institute’s *The Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances* (IGPAR), 2006–2016; Philanthropic outflows in 2018 and 2020 from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.

Note: Historical data on the four resource flows for each year reflect a different number of countries that had data available in that year; therefore, the trend in the graph does not necessarily present the trend over time and may underestimate the real scope of some flows in some countries in a given year. The dash line represents less complete data on cross-border philanthropic outflows before 2004.

High-income countries, representing 32 of the 47 countries included in the estimates, contributed USD 795 billion across the four flows, the majority (95%) of the total amount of USD 841 billion. High-income countries often have stronger economies, higher GDP per capita, and favorable environments for philanthropy, all of which supports larger private resource flows. Additionally, high-income countries tend to have better research infrastructure and more data available on these flows.

Upper-middle income countries and emerging economies have experienced strong growth in the past decade, which has led to an increase in cross-border resources from many of these countries. Some of the top non-DAC donor countries include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Türkiye, and China, all of which are emerging markets. The 14 emerging markets together accounted for nearly one-third (30%) of all countries included in the 2023 *GPT*, contributing around 21 percent of the total amount at USD 179 billion.


Figures 4 and 5 present total cross-border resources by flow for each of the 47 countries. Across all income groups, the top 20 countries with the largest combined amount of the four flows were all high-income countries, except Türkiye and India. Türkiye was classified as upper-middle income in 2020 by the World Bank, ranking 15th. India, a lower-middle income country, ranked 19th. Another large upper-middle income country—China—followed closely after, ranking 21st.

Among the 20 countries with the largest cross-border resource flows in 2020, 15 were DAC members; six were emerging markets, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, South Korea, Türkiye, Qatar, and India. European countries

comprised half of the top 20 countries. The other half included four countries in the Middle East, three in Asia, two in North America, and one in Oceania.

Of the 47 countries included in this report, the United States had the largest contribution at USD 207 billion, 92 percent of which came from individual remittances. Germany ranked 2nd, with USD 82 billion, followed by the United Kingdom at nearly USD 57 billion. Among upper-middle income countries, Türkiye (USD 14 billion) and China (USD 7 billion) contributed the most, followed by South Africa (USD 4 billion). India sent over USD 8 billion, the highest among the four lower-middle income countries.

FIGURE 4. TOTAL CROSS-BORDER RESOURCES BY FLOW AND BY COUNTRY, 2020 (in millions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: ODA and PCI from OECD; Remittances from the World Bank; Philanthropic outflows from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.

Notes: HICs: High-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle income countries; LMICs: Lower-middle income countries; LICs: Low-income countries

† Countries that did not have ODA estimates / † Countries that did not have estimates on PCI

When looking at the amount of the total resource flows as a percentage of GNI, the country list changes significantly (see Figure 5). Among the 20 countries with the largest absolute amount of total resource flows, 12 countries still remained in the top 20 when accounting for a share of their GNI. All ranked differently except Spain, which is 8th on both lists. The largest leaps came from European countries, including four Balkan countries that moved into the top 20, each with total resources accounting for 2 to 5 percent of GNI. Uganda also moved up significantly this year, ranking 11th, up from 39th. It provided USD 806 million in remittances and USD 0.8 million in philanthropy, which combined reaches over 2 percent of GNI. By contrast, eight countries fell out of the top 20 when their contributions were measured as a percentage of GNI. The United States and Japan witnessed the largest decline in ranking, moving down from 1st to 34th and from 5th to 38th, respectively.


Three Middle Eastern emerging markets—the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—had the largest contribution

as a share of GNI among all 47 countries. Particularly, total resources from the United Arab Emirates reached nearly 13 percent of GNI in 2020, rising from 9 percent in 2018. Serbia and Kenya contributed the most as a percentage of GNI in their respective income groups.

Compared with 2018, more countries outside of the high-income group moved in to the top 20 list. Fifteen of the top 20 countries were from the high-income group in 2020, while 18 were high-income countries in 2018. Serbia and Türkiye, both upper-middle income countries, remained within the top 20. The three newcomers on the list were Montenegro and North Macedonia (both from the upper-middle income group), and Uganda (the only low-income country that had available data).

Of the 20 countries with the highest combined flows as percentage of GNI, there were 14 DAC members, 5 emerging markets (the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Türkiye, and Hungary) and 2 frontier markets (Serbia and Croatia).

FIGURE 5. TOTAL CROSS-BORDER RESOURCES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME BY FLOW AND BY COUNTRY, 2020



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: ODA and PCI from OECD; Remittances from the World Bank; Philanthropic outflows from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.

Notes: HICs: High-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle income countries; LMICs: Lower-middle income countries; LICs: Low-income countries

† Countries that did not have ODA estimates / ° Countries that did not have estimates on PCI

B. Official and Private Foreign Assistance

Two key ways in which a country can provide foreign assistance to another country are via ODA and philanthropy, each filling unique roles. ODA is guided by each country's foreign policy goals, which are often affected by various national-level considerations. Private foreign assistance (here a synonym of cross-border philanthropy) reflects the philanthropic culture in a country, capturing the generosity of individuals and strategies of foundations and other philanthropic organizations. While acknowledging the various forms of governance, legal frameworks, and philanthropic standards among the countries included in this report, to create a more holistic picture of foreign assistance it is important to examine how these two flows compare.

In 2020, official and private foreign assistance from the 47 countries included in this report totaled USD 250 billion.¹¹ This amount remained roughly the same as in 2018, which was USD 251 billion when adjusted for inflation.


A majority of the foreign assistance came from high-income countries, at approximately USD 235 billion, accounting for 94 percent of the total. The 14 emerging markets sent over USD 23 billion (9%).

The 10 countries that sent the largest amount of foreign assistance in 2020 remained the same as in 2018 (see Figure 6).

The United States topped the list, at nearly USD 85 billion, largely due to its significant philanthropic outflow. Germany and the United Kingdom ranked 2nd and 3rd, at USD 32 billion and USD 25 billion, respectively. All of these 10 countries, except Türkiye, were high-income, developed economies. Six of them are located in Europe, two in North America, one in Asia, and one in the Middle East. Combined, these 10 countries contributed 83 percent of the total foreign assistance from all 47 countries.

India was the only lower-middle income country that had an estimated ODA value. Therefore, it showed a much larger amount in foreign assistance than the other countries in this group.

FIGURE 6. OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE BY COUNTRY, 2020 (in millions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: ODA from the OECD; Philanthropic outflows from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.

Notes: HICs: High-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle-income countries; LMICs: Lower-middle-income countries; LICs: Low-income countries


† Countries that did not have ODA estimates

¹¹ In the 2023 GPT, nine countries do not have available data on ODA. For a full list of the 38 countries that have available ODA data, see Part III of the report.

Figure 7 presents the official and private foreign assistance as a percentage of GNI by country. Half of the 10 countries with the largest amount in foreign assistance remained within the top 10 when foreign assistance was assessed as a share of GNI. These countries are Germany, the United Kingdom, Türkiye, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Türkiye had the largest

share among all 47 countries at 1.20 percent, followed closely by Sweden and Norway (both at 1.18%). Luxembourg made the largest leap, moving up to 4th from 27th, contributing 1.10 percent of GNI (USD 485 million). The remaining 43 countries were all below 1.0 percent in 2020.

FIGURE 7. OFFICIAL AND PRIVATE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME BY COUNTRY, 2020



Official Development Aid (ODA)

Philanthropy

Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: ODA from the OECD; Philanthropic outflows from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.

Notes: HICs: High-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle income countries; LMICs: Lower-middle income countries; LICs: Low-income countries
† Countries that did not have ODA estimates


Cross-Border Philanthropy

In 2020, cross-border philanthropic outflows from the 47 countries included in the *2023 GPT* remained at nearly the same amount as in 2018, at USD 70 billion.¹² About 60 percent of these countries had updated data that are comparable to the amount in 2018. Among this subgroup of countries, philanthropic outflows went up modestly by around 4 percent, though the change varied greatly by country. Of the countries with comparable data, sixteen countries reported an increase in outflows. The largest growth in dollar value was from the United Kingdom (up by USD 837 million), followed by Germany (up by USD 328 million), the United States (up by USD 253 million), and Switzerland (up by USD 162 million), all with an increase of more than USD 150 million. Twelve countries experienced a decline in outflows. The greatest decrease in the dollar value came from Canada (down by USD 582 million),

followed by Türkiye (down by USD 345 million), the Netherlands (down by USD 105 million), and Finland (down by USD 68 million), all with a decline of over USD 60 million.

At the country level, the amount of philanthropic outflows is positively correlated with GNI per capita in general, as shown in Figure 8. High-income countries tended to have a larger philanthropic outflow, with over USD 2 billion on average and a median of USD 264 million in 2020. Upper-middle income countries contributed USD 64 million on average and a median of nearly USD 5 million. The average amount of the philanthropic outflows from lower-middle income and low-income countries was nearly USD 9 million in 2020, with a median of USD 5 million. The 14 emerging economies donated USD 146 million on average, with a median of USD 58 million.

FIGURE 8. PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME IN 47 COUNTRIES, 2020



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, *2023 Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: GNI and GNI per capita from the World Bank; Philanthropic outflows from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.

Notes: LICs: Low-income countries; LMICs: Lower-middle income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle income countries; HICs: High-income countries.

¹² The data on philanthropic outflows from the 47 countries included in this report vary in terms of quality. The data discussed in this report, therefore, might underestimate the actual scope of philanthropic outflows in some cases. See [Appendix A](#) for the methodology and data quality for each of the 47 countries.



A. Legal Environment for Cross-Border Philanthropy

The role of cross-border philanthropy has become increasingly crucial to address global challenges. The introduction of innovative giving vehicles and new actors, as well as the emerging need for collaborations, reinforces the importance of understanding the increasingly complex international giving landscape. The legal environment for philanthropy has a significant influence on this global scene as it can either encourage or hinder cross-border philanthropy amid increased humanitarian needs. While the *GPT* analyzes the magnitude of cross-border philanthropic contributions, the *Global Philanthropy Environment Index*¹³ (*GPEI*) assesses the regulatory, social, economic, and political environments for philanthropy, including the environment for cross-border philanthropic flows.¹⁴ Thus, these two research efforts augment each other by providing timely and relevant information about the international giving landscape.

Current global issues—such as the COVID-19 pandemic, racial justice, and climate movements as well as the war in Ukraine—have highlighted the opportunities and challenges that cross-border philanthropy faces due to existing regulations and legality of cross-border philanthropic flows¹⁵. According to the *2022 GPEI*, anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism regulations continued to restrict cross-border donations across the world in 2018-2020. This is especially the case for countries in Latin America, the Middle East & North Africa, and Southern Europe, where regulations often restrict cross-border philanthropic inflows and/or outflows due to increasing reporting requirements and stronger due diligence policies, high costs, or burdensome administrative requirements (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2022). Recently, the earthquakes in Syria and Türkiye also underscored the importance of having supportive legal environments to enable cross-border philanthropy. For example, while

40 blockchain entities pledged aid immediately after the disaster, they first needed to ask Turkish authorities to create official crypto asset wallets as the Turkish Central Bank had banned the use of cryptocurrencies for payments in 2021 (Ozsoy, 2021; Handagama, 2023).

The *2022 GPEI* also highlighted that both social and economic inequality and universal human rights were still key issues that philanthropy must address, but that state harassment and critical media campaigns against human rights and watchdog organizations—philanthropic organizations that are often funded internationally—increased in countries across the world. While the overall global environment for philanthropy slightly improved from the period of 2014-2017 to the period of 2018-2020, the environment specifically framing cross-border philanthropic flows experienced the largest score decrease,¹⁶ and 25 countries and economies reported a shrinking space for philanthropy between 2014-2017 and 2018-2020 (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2022). In countries where the political environment for philanthropy experienced a decline, some governments attempted to control the distribution of foreign funding and hinder the operation of human rights and watchdog organizations.

The 2022 GPEI covered 45 of the 47 countries included in the *2023 GPT*.¹⁷ Analyzing these 45 countries, the average overall score for philanthropy is 3.89, indicating an overall favorable philanthropic environment (a score of 3.50 or above). Among the six factors, the score of cross-border philanthropic flows (3.75) was the lowest across countries during the period of 2018-2020. This factor also showed the largest variability range, ranging from 1.0 (Saudi Arabia) to 5.0 (Finland, the Netherlands, North Macedonia, Norway, and Sweden).

¹³ *The GPEI is a one-of-a-kind global report prepared by more than 100 country- and regional-level experts who have assessed the environment for philanthropy in 91 countries and economies by examining the incentives and barriers to giving through six factors: ease of operating a philanthropic organization, tax incentives, cross-border philanthropic flows, political environment, economic environment, and socio-cultural environment.*

¹⁴ *The cross-border philanthropic flows factor “evaluates the laws and regulations governing the incentives and constraints of making and receiving cross-border donations” (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2022, p. 58).*

¹⁵ *See Appendix B for more information on the legality of cross-border flows by country.*

¹⁶ *The GPEI measures the environment for philanthropy on a basis of six factors using a score on the scale of 1 (indicating the least favorable environment) to 5 (reflecting the most favorable environment).*

¹⁷ *The 2022 GPEI does not include Luxembourg and Uganda.*

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR SENDING CROSS-BORDER DONATIONS

Nearly three-fourths (32) of the 45 GPT countries had a favorable environment for sending cross-border philanthropic donations during the period of 2018-2020. However, almost one-fourth (13) of the countries had enacted laws and regulations that restricted sending donations abroad. While many of these restrictive regulations relate to laws on illicit financial flows to meet the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) recommendations, other types of restrictions, such as tax implications or currency exchange regulations, can also hinder sending donations abroad. Some examples are presented below.

In Canada, philanthropic organizations must maintain control and direction over the spending of its funds abroad, must ensure that the undertaking is, in fact, its own project, and must ensure that it has appropriate control over the spending of its funds during joint operations with foreign partners (Aptowitz, 2022).

In China, individuals who donate overseas must abide by relevant provisions and seek the approval of the Foreign Exchange Department. Domestic philanthropic organizations must provide excessive paperwork prior to engaging in any cross-border activities, while social associations must use designated bank accounts, through which they are permitted to make donations abroad (Wang, 2022).

In South Africa, individuals as well as philanthropic organizations are subject to strict exchange control requirements. Registered charitable, religious, or educational bodies need to obtain government approval prior to sending funds in countries outside the Common Monetary Area—Namibia, Lesotho, South Africa and Eswatini. Additionally, while philanthropic organizations have been generally free to conduct their activities outside the country's borders since 2006, they can only receive deductible donations for activities being carried out in South Africa (Wyngaard, 2022).

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR RECEIVING CROSS-BORDER DONATIONS

Two-thirds (30) of the 45 GPT countries had a favorable environment for receiving cross-border philanthropic donations in 2018-2020. However, the remaining 15 countries had laws and regulations, such as foreign agent regulations, that can hinder receiving donations from abroad. While these rules are often enacted in the name of national security and sovereignty, they can be onerous and impede the activities of foreign-funded, legitimate philanthropic organizations. Below are several examples.

In Hungary, the Law on the Transparency of Foreign Funded Organizations, adopted in June 2017 introduced the category of “foreign-funded organizations.” All Hungarian associations and foundations receiving approximately USD 24,000 or more within a given tax year from foreign sources had to notify the court to be registered as “foreign-funded organizations,” indicate their status on their websites, publications, and press materials, and report on each donation over USD 1,700. Failure to comply with the law could result in high fines and possible termination. In June 2020, the European Court of Justice sentenced that the Law was in breach of the European Union law, therefore in May 2021, the Hungarian Parliament withdrew the Law (Hartay, 2022).

In India, the 2020 amendment of the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) are likely to have an adverse impact on receiving cross-border donations. The eligibility criteria for a philanthropic organization to register under FCRA has become more stringent, sub-granting of foreign funds from an FCRA-registered philanthropic organization to another—even FCRA-registered—philanthropic organization has become prohibited, and the cap on administrative expenses was lowered from 50 percent to 20 percent of foreign funds received within a fiscal year (Chopra & Srinath, 2022).

In many countries in the Middle East & North Africa region, receiving cross-border donations is prohibited or heavily regulated. In Qatar, the law prohibits associations from running cross-border fundraising activities and receiving cross-border donations without prior approval, continuous supervision, and proven documentation of such process (Khatib & Farouky, 2018; Farouky, 2022). In Saudi Arabia, receiving cross-border donations is significantly impeded and not permitted (Anonymous, 2022a). In the United Arab Emirates, fundraising or the ability to receive donations from abroad requires permission from local authorities who must be consulted in each instance of such transactions (Anonymous, 2022b).

HIGHLIGHTS BY COUNTRIES' INCOME LEVEL

High-Income Countries

Among the thirty-two high-income countries, only 4 countries—Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—had restrictive environments for cross-border philanthropy. As could be expected, the group of high-income countries had the highest average score for sending (3.9) and receiving (4.0) cross-border donations. While the majority of high-income countries offer a favorable environment for cross-border donations, regulations in place—such as anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism laws, tax acts, and comparability criteria—may still challenge cross-border giving activities.

In Portugal, while there are no substantial restrictions on sending or receiving cross-border charitable donations, the law does not provide substantial tax and customs benefits, which often discourages most donors. Additionally, potential donors are often not aware of possible tax benefits and the organizations to which they could donate across borders, partly due to the fact that communication strategies and advocacy work are often lacking. There is a general lack of knowledge about tax benefits and the entities to which they can be donated. In order to enhance cross-border philanthropic activities in the country, Portugal is part of Transnational Giving Europe, which seeks to encourage a secure and tax-effective cross-border giving framework in terms of donations and fundraising at national and international levels (Marques, 2022).

Upper-Middle Income Countries

Less than half of the 10 upper-middle income countries had a favorable environment for cross-border philanthropy in 2018-2020. Many countries either prohibited or heavily regulated cross-border donations, such as Albania, Brazil, China, Mexico, South Africa, and Türkiye. However, in other upper-middle income countries, such as North Macedonia, philanthropic organizations were allowed to send and receive international donations.

In North Macedonia, philanthropic organizations are free to send donations abroad or receive donations from abroad to support their activities. There is neither a specific approval process nor preconditions for cross-border donations, however, philanthropic organizations need to meet the requirements of Law on Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism when it applies to them. Additionally, North Macedonia provides tax incentives for cross-border donations to natural and other humanitarian disasters (Dokuzovski, 2022).

Lower-Middle Income Countries

The 4 lower-middle income countries in this report—India, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania—provide a mixed picture of cross-border regulations. While India and Nigeria had a restrictive environment for cross-border philanthropy in 2018-2020, Kenya and Tanzania had a moderately favorable environment during the same three-year period.

Kenya showed great improvement in the case of the cross-border philanthropic flows factor. It was reported that the legal framework is somewhat robust and favorable for sending and receiving cross-border donations as long as it aligns with the country's money laundering, anti-terrorism, and fraud prevention laws. Hardly any organizations complained of being inhibited from these operations. Additionally, individual cross-border giving is also thriving in Kenya due to emerging ways of giving, including mobile money transfers (Mwendwa & Sabula, 2022).

Low-Income Countries

Uganda is the only low-income country included in the 2023 GPT. There, the East African Community Customs Management Act exempts goods and equipment of “aid funded projects” from customs duties, however, it does not provide a definition of “aid funded projects” (Council on Foundations, 2020). The country's NGO Act, adopted in 2016, has been used as grounds for suspensions of philanthropic organizations, especially local philanthropic organizations, including those that received foreign funding (Fallon, 2016; Mwesigwa, 2019).

B. Philanthropic Outflows by Donor Countries' Income Level


PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS FROM LOW-INCOME AND LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES

Estimates on philanthropic contributions made to other countries were available in one low-income country (Uganda) and four lower-middle income countries (India, Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania). These countries were home to over 22 percent of the world's population and accounted for about 4 percent of the global GDP. In 2020, these five countries donated a total of USD 42 million abroad, around 11 percent higher than the total of USD 38 million in 2018, when adjusting for inflation. This increase is entirely driven by a modest growth of the philanthropic outflows from India, which went up from USD 9 million (in inflation-adjusted 2020 dollars) in 2018 to USD 13 million in 2020.


Among these five countries, Nigeria had the largest philanthropic outflows, at approximately USD 22 million (Figure 9). However, Kenya contributed the largest share of GNI, followed closely by Nigeria. Data on philanthropic flows are very limited among low-income and lower-middle income countries. India was the only country with an updated estimate since the 2020 GPT was published. Given this lack of data among countries in these two income groups, estimates presented here do not fully capture the real size of their contributions.

FIGURE 9. PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS FROM LOW-INCOME AND LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES, 2020

Philanthropic Outflows (in millions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)



Philanthropic Outflows as a Share of Gross National Income



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: GNI from the World Bank; Philanthropic outflows from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.

Note: LMICs: Lower-middle income countries; LICs: Low-income countries.

PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS FROM UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES

Estimates were available for 10 upper-middle income countries, which were the same countries included in the *2020 GPT*.

Together, they represented 24 percent of the global population and 22 percent of the world's GDP. Philanthropic outflows from these ten countries totaled around USD 644 million in 2020, down by nearly one-third (31%) from the total of USD 929 million in 2018, accounting for inflation adjustments. This substantial drop can be mainly attributed to the 46 percent decline in the philanthropic outflows from Türkiye between the two years. Türkiye sent USD 402 million in 2020, compared with USD 747 million in 2018, adjusted for inflation.

Despite the significant decline, Türkiye remained at the top for this income group, with the highest dollar value and the largest share of GNI (0.06%, see Figure 10). China rose to 2nd place in 2020, contributing USD 103 million, followed by Mexico

(USD 82 million). However, when looking at the philanthropic outflows as a share of GNI, Mexico ranked 2nd while China remained at the bottom of the list. Philanthropic outflows as a percentage of GNI were well below 0.01 percent among all countries in this income group, except for Türkiye and Mexico.


China had the largest growth in philanthropic outflows among all upper-middle income countries, nearly five times the amount in 2018. Serbia saw the largest increase among the five Balkan countries in this income group, up from USD 0.2 million in 2018 inflation-adjusted to USD 2 million in 2020. By contrast, in addition to Türkiye, the philanthropic contributions from Mexico, South Africa, and Montenegro also declined from 2018. Contributions from Mexico decreased by about USD 13 million, while the other two countries had a much smaller drop.

FIGURE 10. PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS FROM UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES, 2020

Philanthropic Outflows (in millions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)



Philanthropic Outflows as a Share of Gross National Income



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, *2023 Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: GNI from the World Bank; Philanthropic outflows from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.

Note: UMICs: Upper-middle income countries.

PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS FROM HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES

Thirty-two high-income countries, all included in the *2020 GPT* as well, had available data on the amount of philanthropic outflows. Of these countries, over 60 percent are in Europe, four are in the Middle East, and the remaining countries span four world regions, including Asia, Latin America, North America, and Oceania. Twenty-six countries are OECD DAC members, and eight are emerging economies¹⁸. These 32 countries accounted for 14 percent of the world’s population and 60 percent of the global GDP in 2020. Together, they contributed USD 69.6 billion in 2020, the same as in 2018 after adjusting for inflation.


As shown in Figure 11, the United States had the largest contribution, both in absolute terms (USD 49 billion) and as a percentage of GNI (0.23%). The United Kingdom ranked 2nd on both lists, with outflows totaling USD 6 billion and 0.22 percent of GNI. Four countries each had over USD 1 billion

in private philanthropy to other countries: Germany (USD 3 billion), Canada (USD 2 billion), Switzerland and France (about USD 1 billion each). Fourteen countries each donated between USD 100 million and USD 1 billion; nine donated between USD 1 million and 100 million; and the remaining three countries contributed below USD 1 million.


The United States and the United Kingdom are the only two countries that donated more than 0.20 percent of GNI abroad. Philanthropic outflows from another five countries also exceeded 0.10 percent of GNI, ranging from 0.10 percent in the Netherlands to 0.19 percent in Qatar. Qatar and the United Arab Emirates were the only non-DAC members among the 25 countries that donated 0.01 percent of GNI or above (0.19% and 0.09%, respectively). Philanthropic outflows as a share of GNI were very small in seven high-income countries, well below 0.01 percent.

FIGURE 11. PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS FROM HIGH-INCOME COUNTRIES, 2020

Philanthropic Outflows (in millions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)



Philanthropic Outflows as a Share of Gross National Income



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, *2023 Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: GNI from the World Bank; Philanthropic outflows from various sources researched by the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy and shared by partner organizations for some countries. See [Appendix A](#) for specific data sources for each country included.

Note: HICs: High-income countries.

¹⁸ These eight emerging countries include Chile, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates.

C. United Nations Sustainable Development Goals

The United Nations (UN) 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were formed to achieve the 2030 Agenda of Sustainable Development and are comprised of 169 targets (UN, 2015). The 2030 Agenda is “a plan of action for people, planet and prosperity” to be achieved by 2030, and 2020 began the Decade of Action, the last decade or the final 10-year countdown to 2030 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2015). No single sector, industry, or society can achieve these ambitious aims individually, especially due to the fact that a previously

estimated USD 2.5 trillion annual funding gap has increased due to the impacts of COVID-19, military conflicts, and climate disaster (OECD, 2022a). Because of these setbacks and their subsequent negative impacts on humans, animals, and nature, achieving the SDGs is more important than ever. Therefore, a wide range of actors—including philanthropic organizations, local and national governments, academia, businesses, and others—must work collaboratively if the goals are to be achieved by 2030 (Prescott et al., 2020).



Source: UN <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/news/communications-material/>

THE SDGS IN 2023: PROGRESS AND DATA AVAILABILITY

In 2020, the estimated annual financing gap for achieving the SDGs was USD 2.5 trillion, and today that number has risen by 56 percent to an annual total of USD 3.9 trillion (OECD, 2022a). This gap is expected to increase to USD 4.3 trillion between 2020-2025, according to the International Monetary Fund and the UN Conference on Trade and Development (2022).

No individual sector can close this funding gap; rather, a blended finance approach is needed to ensure funding is attained, which includes the under-utilized philanthropic sector (OECD, 2022a). According to the SDG Philanthropy Platform (SDGPP, 2023), an estimated USD 651 billion could potentially be gathered via the philanthropic sector by the time the SDGs are to be achieved. The SDGPP (2023) highlights that in order to achieve the goal of increased amount of philanthropic giving to the SDGs, it is necessary for actors to support policy, educate their donors, and unlock potential resources.

The UN published *The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2022* that highlights that less than half of the countries have international comparable data on eight out of the 17 SDGs.¹⁹ COVID-19 negated four years' worth of progress toward achieving SDG 1, deepened the "global learning crisis," and "caused the first rise in between-country income inequality in a generation" (UN, 2022, pp. 8, 11, 17). In addition to the negative impact that the COVID-19 pandemic had on the world attaining the SDGs, as the virus spread the need for accurate and timely data increased suddenly. Concurrently, national statistic offices around the world had to grapple with the inability to collect in-person data, while also seeking to provide necessary data, for example, to those attempting to curb the spread of the virus (UN, 2022). Because of these limitations, new forms of non-traditional sources (e.g., mobile phone data), new data collection methods (e.g., web interviews), and innovative partnerships emerged. The success of such adaptations has varied, though, and there still remains a significant gap in data availability. Initiatives like the "Global Week to #Act4SDGs" in September 2022 encouraged individuals and organizations to log their SDG actions, and the global map will continue running until 2030, collecting and publishing data on SDGs, countries participating, and other measurements.²⁰

THE SDGS AND PHILANTHROPY

Concerns over lack of data availability, which impacts the global tracking of the SDGs worldwide, is also relevant when attempting to quantify philanthropic contributions toward the SDGs. Still, philanthropy is key to achieving the SDGs (Sachs et al., 2022). Both philanthropic organizations as well as charitable activities have a part to play.

Philanthropic organizations around the world have come together at the regional level to evaluate how they can work together to achieve the SDGs. The European Community Foundation Initiative's (2019) report explains that community foundations "provide an important connection between local actions and global aspirations," and they estimated that 60 percent of European community foundations acknowledged that their work correlated with the SDGs. The Arab Foundations Forum (AFF), with members spanning 12 countries, has specifically focused on SDGs 8, 13, 16, and 17, while their member organizations have reported dedicating resources to all but three of the SDGs. Nearly 75 percent of AFF member organizations focus on SDG 4, and nearly 65 percent focus on SDGs 1, 8, and 10 (Arab Foundations Forum, 2023). The East Africa Philanthropy Network is comprised of 60 regional and national philanthropic organizations in Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. In their 2021 survey, they found that 106 surveyed institutional donors typically focus on multiple SDGs at once because of the interconnected nature of social development (East Africa Philanthropy Network, 2022). When asked which SDG they primarily supported, the two goals that gained the most support were SDG 8 (24.83%) and SDG 5 (24.16%). The least popular was SDG 13 (8.05%) due to a knowledge gap of climate-related solutions and programs.

The SDGs provide common aims across sectors, and they also function as a common language by which various sectors can come together to address society's core barriers to sustainable development (Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, 2019). To facilitate the usage of the SDG language and encourage SDG data collection and reporting among philanthropic organizations, the SDG Philanthropy Platform created the "SDG Indicator Wizard" to translate existing aims, such as the organization's mission statement and project goals, and indicate the SDG targets and indicators to which they are linked.²¹

¹⁹ "While Goal 3 (health) and Goal 7 (energy) have the highest data availability (more than 80 percent of countries have at least one data point since 2015), only around 20 percent of countries have data for Goal 13 (climate action)" (UN, 2022, p. 4).

²⁰ For more information, visit <https://act4sdgs.org/>.

²¹ For more information, visit <https://www.sdghphilanthropy.org/SDG-Indicator-Wizard>.

D. Cross-Border Philanthropy by Charitable Causes

Fourteen of the 47 countries included in this report had available data on cross-border giving by charitable causes. However, a majority of these countries did not align this information explicitly to the SDGs, showing that data availability on the SDGs is still extremely limited eight years after the enactment of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The top three charitable causes were education (9 countries), health (9), and religion (3). Humanitarian aid and emergency responses (2), international affairs and development (2), and social infrastructure (2) were also among the top charitable causes supported by cross-border philanthropic contributions (see Table 4).

TABLE 4. DATA ON CROSS-BORDER PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS BY TOP CHARITABLE CAUSE

<i>Charitable Causes</i>	<i>Number of Countries</i>	<i>Countries</i>
EDUCATION	9	AUSTRALIA, CHINA, FRANCE, INDIA, ISRAEL, SOUTH KOREA, SPAIN, TANZANIA, UGANDA
HEALTH	9	AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BELGIUM, CHINA, ISRAEL, NIGERIA, SOUTH KOREA, SPAIN, UNITED STATES
RELIGION	3	INDIA, TANZANIA, UGANDA
HUMANITARIAN AID AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE (INCLUDING COVID-19 RESPONSES)	3	AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, CHINA
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND DEVELOPMENT	2	FRANCE, UNITED STATES
SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE	2	AUSTRIA, FRANCE

Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Spotlight on Global Philanthropic Responses towards the Fight against the COVID-19 Pandemic

In December 2019, cases of what is now known as COVID-19 first began to appear in the Wuhan province of China. Cases began to spread across borders in early 2020, and lockdowns were imposed in China and neighboring countries in an attempt to slow infections. On March 11, 2020, after about 120,000 cases and 4,300 deaths were confirmed, the World Health Organization officially declared the COVID-19 crisis a pandemic (CDC, n.d.). In 2020, 3.3 million people died from COVID-19 (World Health Organization, n.d.-a).

Due to the widespread social and economic effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, such as unemployment and isolation from social, economic, and mental support, global collaboration and coordinated humanitarian assistance was necessary to tackle the emerging challenges. Cross-border philanthropy has played an important role in the pandemic response through its ability to take risks and ensure flexible, rapid responses. In particular, cross-border collaboration of international institutions with local philanthropic organizations allowed global philanthropic resources to reach areas that most needed assistance.

Global Funds

Countless corporations, foundations, and individuals have donated to the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic since 2020. As with any global health crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic has required strong, cross-border collective action to alleviate the immediate and long-term consequences. Many international organizations initiated campaigns to raise funds from governments, foundations, and corporations. Examples of these global funds include the European Commission's Coronavirus Global Response Fund, UNICEF's Coronavirus (COVID-19) Global Response Appeal, and the World Health Organization's (WHO) COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2020).

In partnership with the UN Foundation and the Swiss Philanthropy Foundation, WHO appealed to governments, intergovernmental organizations, development banks, foundations, and corporations to contribute to their global fund. WHO's COVID-19 Solidarity Response Fund received historic donations from 680,000 donors from around the globe, contributing USD 256.2 million between March 2020 and December 31, 2021, when the fund ceased active fundraising (World Health Organization, 2021a).

Global Distribution of Cross-Border Donations – WHO's COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan

WHO's COVID-19 Strategic Preparedness and Response Plan (SPRP) coordinates global- and regional-level distribution of funds (World Health Organization, 2023b). As of December 2022, the international community donated USD 1.1 billion and pledged USD 56.6 million towards this fund, however WHO still estimated a gap of USD 436.5 million for the fight against COVID-19 (World Health Organization, 2023a). Multilateral organizations contributed USD 123.2 million, foundations contributed USD 9 million, and governments contributed USD 984.1 million to WHO's COVID-19 Response Fund. By geographic location of foundations, the top three contributors were Switzerland (USD 4.8 million), the United Kingdom (USD 3.8 million), and the United States (USD 0.5 million). The top three government contributors in 2022 were Germany (USD 352.8 million), the United States (USD 331.7 million), and Iran (USD 85.3 million).

The SPRP highlighted three goals to achieve with their funding: increase monitoring and genomic testing and sequencing capacity; support the equitable distribution of vaccinations and other instruments; and assist countries experiencing sudden surges of COVID-19 variants (World Health Organization, 2021c). In 2020 and 2021, WHO redistributed USD 1.3 billion through the SPRP (World Health Organization, 2021b).

Vaccine donations

After COVID-19 vaccines were developed by major biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies such as Pfizer and Moderna, one of the most important cross-border giving trends became vaccine giving. Many governments, private companies, and foundations donated vaccines to alleviate COVID-19 vaccine inequity across countries, since COVID-19 vaccine distribution has been a crucial and powerful strategy to stop the spread of the virus (de Bengy Puyvallée & Storeng, 2022).

One pillar of the Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator, COVAX is a collaboration between the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI)²², Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance²³, WHO, and UNICEF. Its mission is to expedite the research and production of COVID-19 vaccines and to provide fair and equal access to vaccines for all countries (World Health Organization, n.d.). According to the most recent COVAX *Data Brief*, 33 countries donated to this initiative and a total of 112 countries received vaccine doses as of February 13, 2023 (Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, 2023). Gavi also provides publicly available information about annual contributions and proceeds for vaccine donations, which provide breakdowns of public and private sector funding for their initiatives. According to their annual report, pledges from the private sector accounted for 10 percent (USD 2.13 billion) of their total funding between 2021 and 2025 (Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, 2022). Government donors and the European Commission account for the other 90 percent (USD 19.07 billion) in pledged funds. In the same period, the breakdown of proceeds from the private sector remained at 10 percent (USD 2.06 billion) with government donors and the European Commission donating the remaining 90 percent (USD 18.62 billion) (Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, 2022).

Variations in Data Availability on Giving to COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic required philanthropy to support local and global initiatives to fight against this disease. However, data collection and reporting on giving to COVID-19 related causes is still limited and varies from country to country. Several countries—such as France²⁴, South Korea²⁵, and Switzerland²⁶—have an umbrella organization that publishes comprehensive reports of philanthropic contributions to the domestic and/or global COVID-19 pandemic, including the overall money donated, how the funds were utilized, and information about the recipients.

²² *The Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) is an international public-private partnership with the goal of advancing vaccine development against pandemic threats.* <https://cepi.net/>

²³ *Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance aims at vaccinating children against diseases like COVID-19. Gavi collaborates with diverse donors, including governments, private sector foundations and corporate partners, NGOs, professional and community associations, faith-based organizations, and academia.* <https://www.gavi.org/>

²⁴ <https://www.actions-fondations-covid19.org/>

²⁵ <https://research.beautifulfund.org/13084/>

²⁶ <https://www.swissfoundations.ch/fr/covid-19/>

In other countries, local media reported large gifts toward the fight against the pandemic at the individual/organizational level. Scarce data combined with different methodologies and reporting techniques make it challenging to identify and quantify total philanthropic responses to the COVID-19 pandemic at the national and global level. Furthermore, only a handful of countries have provided data on cross-border contributions.

Cross-Border Giving towards the Fight against the COVID-19 Pandemic

The Charities Aid Foundation (CAF) published a report on how donors responded to the COVID-19 crisis via the CAF Global Alliance. Through CAF America's expedited grantmaking program, the alliance administered more than three million dollars in COVID-19 emergency grants: more than USD 2 million through CAF UK, USD 620,000 through CAF Russia, USD 476,000 through CAF Canada, USD 240,000 through Good2Give in Australia, and USD 130,000 through CAF India (Charities Aid Foundation, 2023).

Switzerland's Swiss Solidarity COVID-19 campaign disclosed aggregated totals, recipient nations, and mission details for each project. The fund collected a total of CHF 14.5 million, which was used to finance 24 projects in 17 countries. The top destination for projects was South Asia (16 projects), followed by Latin America (8 projects), the Middle East (7 projects), and Africa (3 projects). Of these projects, 17 were targeted to offer financial support to families affected by lockdowns, 11 supported medical care and prevention, and 6 focused on education measures and protecting women and children against gender-based violence (Swiss Solidarity, 2021).

In China, the Asian Venture Philanthropy Network (AVPN)—comprised of international philanthropic foundations, impact investment funds, non-governmental organizations, social enterprises, and development agencies—supported COVID-19 efforts in various capacities in 2020. For example, in the Hubei province, the One Foundation devised a system that delivered various medical supplies to more than 800 hospitals. In Hong Kong, initiatives such as the Hong Kong Jockey Club Charities Trust's COVID-19 Emergency Fund committed a total of USD 25 million in relief (Xu, 2020).

CAF Russia collaborated with the CAF Global Alliance, and CAF America specifically, to facilitate the transfer of foreign funds to Russian organizations, which were hesitant to receive funding from overseas donors. Thanks to this collaboration, Russian organizations were able to access international funding and CAF Russia was able to distribute more cross-border support (Charities Aid Foundation, 2023). As of December 2020, RUB 100.78 million (USD 1.3 million) had been raised through the *GivingTuesdayNow* initiative, the main fundraiser effort in Russia (Charities Aid Foundation, 2023).

E. Recipients of Cross-Border Philanthropy by Region

There is limited data available on recipient countries and regions of cross-border philanthropic flows. Forty percent of the 47 countries included in this report had data on recipients of cross-border philanthropy. Two-fifths (19) of the 47 countries covered had available information on the recipient regions (12) or countries (7) of their cross-border philanthropic activities.

Based on this limited data set, the analysis showed that the most-commonly supported region was Africa, as it was one of

the top three recipient regions of cross-border philanthropy in 15 of the 19 countries (Table 5). Asia (9 countries) and Europe (9 countries) were also frequent beneficiaries of international charitable donations, but the Middle East & North Africa (6 countries), North America (5 countries), as well as Latin America & the Caribbean (4 countries) also received cross-border philanthropic contributions from various countries. Notably, the analysis clearly indicates that developed regions and high-income countries can be recipients of cross-border giving.

TABLE 5: DATA ON CROSS-BORDER PHILANTHROPIC OUTFLOWS BY TOP RECIPIENT REGION

<i>Recipient Region</i>	<i>Number of Countries</i>	<i>Countries</i>
AFRICA	15	AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, CHINA, CROATIA, FRANCE, KENYA, NIGERIA, QATAR, SOUTH KOREA, SPAIN, TANZANIA, TÜRKIYE, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, UNITED STATES
ASIA	9	AUSTRALIA, AUSTRIA, CHINA, KENYA, NIGERIA, QATAR, SOUTH KOREA, TANZANIA, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
EUROPE	9	AUSTRIA, BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA, CHINA, CROATIA, MONTENEGRO, NORTH MACEDONIA, QATAR, SERBIA, TÜRKIYE
NORTH AMERICA	5	FRANCE, KENYA, NIGERIA, SPAIN, TANZANIA
LATIN AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN	4	CHILE, SOUTH KOREA, SPAIN, UNITED STATES
MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA	6	AUSTRALIA, FRANCE, SPAIN, TÜRKIYE, UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, UNITED STATES

Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF FOUNDATION GRANTS

Candid's tracking tool *SDG Funders* captures total foundation giving and numbers of grants supporting UN SDGs by world region on an interactive map. Since 2016, the top three SDGs in terms of funding were Goal 4 (Quality Education), Goal 3 (Good Health and Well-Being), and Goal 16 (Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions). North America has reported the largest amount in foundation funding for the SDGs since 2016 (USD 183.4 billion), followed by Asia (USD 8.4 billion), Europe (USD 4.3 billion), and Africa (USD 4.2 billion) (Candid, 2023a).

The OECD's publication *Private Philanthropy for Development – Second Edition: Data for Action* found that the majority of the private philanthropic giving between 2015-2016 from 205 foundations were cross-border philanthropic flows (OECD, 2021). Nearly half (44%) of total philanthropic giving was not allocable by country or region, suggesting numerous grants were either dispersed at a global scale or spanned multiple countries. Focusing on the philanthropic flows that were allocable by region or country, the report showed that the top three regions that received cross-border philanthropic support were Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean, and Asia (OECD, 2021).

Spotlight on Cross-Border Philanthropy and Climate Change

While initiatives to mitigate the effects of climate change may be local in nature, their success will have global ramifications in the fight to cap global warming at 1.5°C. Therefore, one area where cross-border philanthropy is most needed is climate change. As the window to limit warming narrows, raising concern that current levels of climate funding will be insufficient, there is increased pressure to mobilize funding for climate issues and calls for philanthropic organizations to dedicate more resources to the cause (Uchida, 2022). Philanthropy has the potential to create donor collaboratives and expert networks, support research and data collection, and fund local and global initiatives to combat climate change (Delanoë, Sellen, & Gautier, 2021). Cross-border philanthropy and collaboration will be increasingly important in climate mitigation and adaptation efforts because funds from high-income countries can work toward sustainable development in least-developed countries, which are disproportionately affected by climate change (UNOHRLLS, 2021).

The amount of foundation funding dedicated to climate change mitigation has more than tripled since 2015, growing from USD 900 million in 2015 to over more than USD 3 billion in 2021 according to a study of about 70 large climate-focused foundations around the world (ClimateWorks Foundation, 2022). Between 2020 and 2021 alone, funding increased 25 percent, suggesting growing momentum in funding climate action. Of the foundation and nonprofit leaders in the United States recently surveyed by the Center for Effective Philanthropy, 61 percent of foundation leaders and 25 percent of nonprofit leaders reported that their organization funds or supports climate change (Orensten et al., 2022). Climate is an increasing concern of the foundations included in the Foundation 1000 dataset²⁷; these foundations increased giving to climate from USD 1.3 billion in the 2011-2015 period to USD 1.8 billion between 2016-2019 (Candid & Council on Foundations, 2022). More than half of this amount (USD 1 billion) supported climate change outside of the US; USD 514.3 million supported global-level programs, USD 274.5 million went to Asia and the Pacific, USD 203.4 million went to Western Europe, USD 107.0 million went to Latin America, and USD 49.4 million went to Sub-Saharan Africa.

At the individual donor level, climate is a smaller priority. In 2020, among individual donors in the United States USD 8 billion was donated to climate, or 2 percent of total individual giving, and only 0.4 percent supported organizations prioritizing emissions reduction (Thomas, 2022). There is potential for increased contributions from individuals, however, as climate-focused crowdfunding platforms like Raise Green²⁸ and One Earth²⁹ allow individuals to contribute directly to projects presenting solutions to climate change.

Climate change is also a focus of many high-net worth philanthropists. For example, the founding family of the Patagonia company dedicated their ownership stake—worth approximately USD 3 billion—to a trust and nonprofit with the purpose of fighting climate change, championing giving to this cause. The company's future profits, about USD 100 million annually, will also be dedicated to this cause.

²⁷ The Foundation 1000 is a dataset of grants of USD 10,000 or higher given by the 1,000 largest US funders within a year.

²⁸ <https://www.raisegreen.com/>

²⁹ <https://www.oneearth.org/>

Jeff Bezos, founder of Amazon, committed USD 10 billion to his Bezos Earth Fund with a similar purpose; Lauren Powell Jobs, the widow of Apple founder Steve Jobs, pledged USD 3.5 billion to a group working toward climate action (Gelles, 2022). Donors on the EdelGive Hurun India Philanthropy List—a list of the biggest donors in India—increased their donations to climate and sustainability by 46 percent in 2022, contributing USD 28 million to the cause (Alliance Magazine, 2023). Swiss entrepreneur Hansjörg Wyss pledged to donate 16 percent (USD 1 billion) of his wealth to climate over a decade with the goal of conserving 30 percent of the Earth in its natural state (Cao, 2020).

Research is receiving increased attention as the need for climate financing is increasing. Two major donations to Harvard University (USD 200 million and USD 350 million) will be used to establish an institute focused on climate solutions and to support an institute for biological engineering. These donations come amid concern that insufficient data is hindering climate mitigation efforts. One estimate found that only 16 percent of the necessary investments in data for climate mitigation is being met; another study determined inaccuracy of emissions reporting data among oil and gas producers (Uchida, 2022).

Still, there are calls for major donors to do more. The Donors for Climate pledge encourages donors who contribute more than GBP 1,000 per year across the globe to sign a promise to address climate change on seven pillars, including committing resources, educating oneself, and advocating for the cause (Donors for Climate, n.d.). The Climate Funders Justice Pledge, an initiative of the Donors of Color Network, aims to accelerate climate funding to groups with a focus on environmental justice in the United States (Climate Funders Justice Pledge, n.d.). As BIPOC-led groups receive only 1.3 percent of US climate philanthropy, the pledge aims to ensure equitable funding and promote environmental and racial justice by committing signatories to contribute 30 percent of their resources to these groups. The International Philanthropy Commitment on Climate Change is a pledge for foundations to commit to various aspects of climate action, from education to sustainable operations and commitment of resources. As of March 2023, over 600 foundations joined this initiative (Philanthropy for Climate, n.d.).

Simultaneously, regional-level philanthropic organizations are developing solutions to the challenges of climate change. For example, the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and African Climate Foundation (ACF) are continent wide initiatives to address climate issues. The ECF focuses on reaching net zero emissions, and the ACF supports African-led projects and aims to build knowledge-sharing networks with an emphasis on the relationship between climate and development (Alliance Magazine, 2021). In Asia, the Climate Action Platform of the Asian Venture Philanthropy Network (AVPN) aims to harness venture philanthropy funding for the purpose of developing climate solutions across multiple industries (AVPN, n.d.).

Climate change has also been a growing focus of ODA. The share of bilateral ODA allocated to climate change increased from 21.7 percent in 2013 to 33.4 percent in 2020, reaching a total of USD 44 billion (OECD, 2022b). This growth was driven by growing support from Japan, which increased its commitments by more than two times the previous amount, and France, which increased its commitments around 40 percent. Adaptation received the largest share (14%) of climate-related ODA for the first time, surpassing mitigation funding (11%) and funding for activities that supported both mitigation and adaptation efforts (8%).

In 2020, the top two regional recipients of climate-related ODA were Asia (41%) and Africa (25%), with a smaller percentage going to America, Europe, and Oceania. Sectors with high emissions, like transportation and energy, received the most ODA targeted for mitigation efforts, while sectors like agriculture, forestry and fishing, and water supply and sanitation received the most support for adaptation. In some sectors, like agriculture and general environmental protection, funding supported not only adaptation but also mitigation.

According to the Climate Policy Initiative in their report on the *Global Landscape of Climate Finance*, almost half (49%, or USD 310 billion in 2020) of worldwide financing for climate comes from private actors, including individuals, commercial financial institutions, and corporations (Naran et al., 2021). International private capital investment is also a growing source of climate finance, rising to USD 153 billion in 2019-2020 from USD 13 billion in 2017-2018. The largest destination of international climate investments was Western Europe (USD 31 billion), followed by East Asia & Pacific (USD 22 billion), South Asia (USD 19 billion), Latin America & the Caribbean (USD 19 billion), and Sub-Saharan Africa (USD 18 billion).

Climate philanthropy has gained traction in recent years, and there is still room for it to grow. The philanthropic sector, and especially cross-border philanthropy, can do more in the fight against climate change. Donors could pool together to support reforestation in countries that would maximize carbon reduction; philanthropic organizations could bear some of the risks of investing in technological climate solutions that traditional investments cannot; and civil society sectors in multiple countries could join together and share knowledge on climate issues (Cox, 2021).

Additionally, despite the current growth on climate philanthropy, concerns remain that the current level of funding is not enough and may not be reaching those who need it most. Concerns about climate justice and the overall effectiveness of climate philanthropy have created innovative and purposeful avenues of engagement for philanthropy in the climate debate (UNRISD & EDGE Funders Alliance, 2022). Some areas of the world that are responsible for a smaller share of greenhouse gas emissions face disproportionate repercussions of climate change yet receive the least funding. Africa, for example, is responsible for the smallest percentage of emissions but receives only USD 29.5 billion per year in climate funding, a little more than 10 percent of the necessary USD 277 billion it will need annually to reach its 2030 climate goals (ClimateWorks Foundation, 2022). It is thus crucial to focus not only on the volume but also on the equitable distribution of global climate philanthropy.

As climate philanthropy continues to grow, the power of cross-border philanthropy can and should be mobilized to innovate climate solutions and ensure a just allocation of funds. As it does, it will be important to collect data on the flows of climate donations to improve the understanding of the climate philanthropy landscape and how it is distributed across countries and sectors. Climate change is a global phenomenon, and as such, international collaboration and cross-border philanthropy will be critical to tackle climate challenges at the local and global levels.

F. Cross-Border Volunteering

Donations of time, known as volunteering, is a key aspect of philanthropy. Volunteering is a non-compulsory, unpaid activity to generate goods or provide services for others who are outside ones household (International Labour Organisation, 2013).

The UN General Assembly resolution on “Volunteering for the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” encourages governments to form partnerships with the UN, the private sector, civil society, and others to integrate volunteerism into national and international frameworks of action to help achieve the SDGs. Both domestic and cross-border volunteering play an increasing role for the realization of the sustainable development goals (UN Volunteers, 2022). However, data on the extent and character of cross-border volunteering tends to be small scale or collected in ways that do not allow global comparison across time or localities.

The UN *2022 State of the World's Volunteerism Report* (2022) estimated that the monthly number of volunteers aged 15 years and over amounts to approximately 862.4 million people worldwide; these volunteers represent the equivalent of 61 million full-time (40 hour/week) workers each month. While data on volunteering is slowly improving, efforts to increased data availability has been negatively affected by the COVID-19 pandemic and the limited available data depicts mainly formal volunteering from countries in the Global North (UN Volunteers, 2022). Thus, it is likely that the total number of volunteers around the world is underestimated.

Cross-border volunteering, also called export volunteering, overseas volunteering, or international volunteering, began as a movement in the early 20th century as a peaceful alternative to post-war and postcolonial international development systems (Lough, 2015; Schech, 2017). The popularity of cross-border volunteering has steadily increased due to several factors, such as a diversification in the variety of opportunities, the ability for people—especially teenagers—to travel abroad, and a rising sentiment of global citizenship (Tiessen, 2017). Additionally, technological improvements and innovative solutions for online volunteering have the potential to further expand cross-border volunteering opportunities (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023).

Cross-border volunteering has developed into two types: volunteering for international understanding and volunteering for development aid and humanitarian relief (Meneghini, 2016; Schech, 2017; Sherraden et al., 2008). The former focuses on the volunteer as the beneficiary, emphasizing international experiences,

cross-culture skills, and global citizenship. The latter focuses on the host community/organization as the beneficiary, aiming to use expertise to promote social, economic and environmental development through service delivery and knowledge transfer (Randel et al., 2004; Sherraden et al., 2008). The length of volunteer placement duration has developed into three categories: short-term (one–eight weeks), medium-term (three–six months), and long-term (six months or longer) (Sherraden et al., 2006).

Host communities, volunteers, and sending communities can all be positively impacted by cross-border volunteering (Sherraden et al., 2008). Host communities can receive social, economic, or environmental development, international knowledge and technology, and engage in cultural exchanges. Volunteers can obtain practical experience and personal development and help promote global understanding. Returning volunteers contribute to their home communities by promoting human capital, cross-cultural interaction, and global civic engagement.

The effects of cross-border volunteering vary depending on the characteristics of volunteers and programs. A number of studies reveal concerns associated with “voluntourism” placements, and show that the goal of relationship building and development aid is “poorly served by the short-term presence, poor skills, and relative disorganization of tourists” (Schech, 2017; Vradi & Montsion, 2014). Additionally, short-term programs can reinforce stereotypes and divides between the Global North and Global South (Schech, 2017; Simpson, 2004; Tiessen & Kumar, 2013). Host organizations have consistently preferred experienced and skilled volunteers who can commit to at least six months because of the value of the volunteers and hosts engaging in sustained, meaningful relationships and cross-cultural encounters (Lough, 2012; Perold et al., 2013; Tiessen, 2017; Watts, 2002).

When considering the impacts of cross-border volunteering, one study on 288 development volunteer organizations in 68 countries identified how the duration of stay and the skill level of volunteers impacts how effective they are perceived to be at expanding organizational capacity and building international relationships with host communities (Lough & Tiessen, 2018). The findings indicate that skilled volunteers were more successful at building organizational capacity than unskilled volunteers, regardless of their length of service in the host community. When examining the ability to form international relationships, long-term volunteers were perceived to be more effective than the short-term less-skilled volunteers, but interestingly there was no significant difference when compared to the short-term skilled volunteers.

Existing research suggests that short-term volunteers can be more effective if they make multiple trips and sustain their engagement with the same host communities for a few years (Lough, 2016).

Among the 47 countries studied in this report, 18 had some data on cross-border volunteering, but not all of them had updated data for 2020 or after. In this scan of available data, cross-border volunteering is defined to include both volunteering abroad and

volunteering with domestic philanthropic organizations in the field of international activities. In many countries, volunteering—especially volunteering abroad—was paused or forced to adopt a virtual model after March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the ensuing worldwide lockdowns and travel restrictions. Table 6 presents these 18 countries where some, albeit limited, data on cross-border volunteering can be found.³⁰

TABLE 6. DATA AVAILABILITY ON CROSS-BORDER VOLUNTEERING BY COUNTRY

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of Volunteers or Equivalent Estimates</i>	<i>Hours/Frequency of Volunteering or Equivalent Estimates</i>	<i>Charitable Causes Supported by Volunteers</i>	<i>Geographic Regions/ Countries Served by Volunteers</i>	<i>Estimated Economic Value of Volunteer Work</i>	<i>Most Recent Year with Data</i>
AUSTRALIA	X		X	X		2021-2022
CANADA	X					2020-2021
FRANCE	X	X	X	X		2021
GERMANY	X	X	X	X		2020
ISRAEL	X				X	2020
ITALY	X					2015
MEXICO	X					2018
NETHERLANDS	X					2019
NEW ZEALAND	X	X			X	2018
NORWAY	X					2021
SLOVAK REPUBLIC	X	X				2019
SOUTH AFRICA	X					2018
SOUTH KOREA	X			X		2021
SPAIN	X		X	X		2020
SWEDEN	X					2021
SWITZERLAND	X	X				2021
UNITED KINGDOM	X	X				2017-2018
UNITED STATES	X	X			X	2014-2015

Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

³⁰ Only the availability of cross-border philanthropy data is presented in Table 6, given their limited comparability as the sources of information varies, including national associations, national statistical agencies, surveys of representative national samples, and organizational annual reports among others.



As shown in Table 6, only a handful of countries had detailed information on cross-border volunteering. To offer a snapshot of volunteering abroad during the COVID-19 pandemic, six countries are highlighted below. While travel was restricted due to the health crisis, all but one country (the United States) had updated data on the number of cross-border volunteers who went abroad during 2020.

AUSTRALIA

The Australian Volunteers Program (AVP), sponsored by the government, deploys Australians to the Asia-Pacific region. The AVP replaced the Australian Volunteers for International Development program in January 2018 and directly supports the SDGs. Assignments focus on “inclusive economic growth, human rights, and climate change / disaster resilience / food security” (Australian Volunteers Program, 2019). They also build volunteers’ competencies across several skill sets including education, development, disaster and emergency management, and engineering. To help support sustainable development, partner countries and Australian organizations form long-term partnerships.

Due to the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of AVP volunteers decreased from 943 in FY2018–2019 to 287 volunteers in FY2020–2021 (Australian Volunteers Program, 2019; Australian Volunteers Program, 2021). In FY2021–2022, numbers began to rebound to 386 volunteers (Australian Volunteers Program, 2022). Some of these volunteers participated in international development projects online, with 311 remote assignments and 32 international assignments completed in FY2020–2021 and 449 remote assignments and 65 international assignments completed in FY2021–2022 (Australian Volunteers Program, 2021; Australian Volunteers Program, 2022).

Almost half the assignments in FY2021–2022 were in Asia (46%), and a smaller proportion were in the Pacific and Timor-Leste (42%) or Africa (12%). The partner organizations in these countries work in various sectors, from government and civil society (26% of partner organizations) to education (15%), social infrastructure and services (15%), and health (13%) (Australian Volunteers Program, 2022).

In addition to AVP volunteers, the Australian Council for International Development (ACFID) member organizations have deployed volunteers internationally, including 1,558 international volunteers in FY2018–2019 (Australian Council for International Development, 2019). In FY2020–2021, no volunteers served abroad, but 8,994 Australians volunteered domestically for the 130 ACFID member organizations (Australian Council for International Development, 2022).

FRANCE

France Volontaires is under the auspices of the French Ministry of Europe and Foreign Affairs, and is the main coordinator for international volunteering in France. It brings together public agencies and international solidarity organizations to coordinate “Volontariats Internationaux d’Echange et de Solidarité” (Volunteering for International Exchange and Solidarity, VIES). This program allows cross-border volunteering for various projects ranging from youth exchange programs, development cooperation projects, skill-based volunteer exchanges, and programs run under the “Francophonie,” an international organization of French-speaking countries.

In 2021, 3,379 VIES participants volunteered across the world. Nearly 44 percent of volunteers (1,484) participated in the Service civique (SC) program, through which youth between the ages of 16 and 25 work in various sectors, including international development and humanitarian action, for a period of 6 to 12 months. The Volontariat de Solidarité Internationale (VSI) program, in which volunteers dedicate one to six years to humanitarian development, represented 42.6 percent (1,348) of the volunteers in 2021. Three-quarters of VSI hold a master’s or higher degree. About 10 percent of overall volunteers (337) participated in the Volontariat d’Initiation et d’Echange (VIE) in 2021, which is comprised of two programs targeted to young people who work on international solidarity projects in France or abroad: The Jeunesse Solidarité Internationale (JSI) and the Ville, Vie, Vacances / Solidarité Internationale (VVV/SI). The smallest program in 2021 was the Volontariat d’Echanges et de Compétences (VEC), through which working or retired people apply their expertise to short-term development projects. Only 3.6 percent (120) of volunteers participated in the VEC in 2021 (France Volontaires, 2022).

Additionally, France Volontaires shares data on two volunteer programs outside of their umbrella: Cotravaux and Scouts et Guides de France (SGDF). Volunteers in the Cotravaux program can participate on short- or long-term projects that support learning, citizenship, and solidarity. In 2021, 824 Cotravaux volunteers served abroad. In summer 2021, due largely to the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, there were only 1,223 SGDF participants volunteering abroad, less than half of the usual number of around three to four thousand (France Volontaires, 2022).

A total of 5,426 volunteers participated across these international volunteering programs in 2021. This is an 83.6 percent increase from the drop to 2,956 volunteers in 2020, yet still lower than the 8,554 international volunteers in 2019 (France Volontaires 2022a; France Volontaires 2022b; France Volontaires 2021). At 44.5 percent of volunteers, European Union countries hosted the most volunteers in 2021, followed by Sub-Saharan Africa (27.8%), Asia and Oceania (9.3%), Middle East & North Africa (8.9%), Latin America & the Caribbean (5.8%), and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (3.8%) (France Volontaires, 2022).

GERMANY

Data on international volunteering is gathered annually by the Network and Competence Center for International Personnel Cooperation (German name: AKLHÜ e.V.), supported by the Ministry for Family, Seniors, Women, and Youth. According to their data, in 2020 only 2,441 people were able to participate in their planned volunteer programs, because 3,465 positions were dropped due to the COVID-19 pandemic; this meant that approximately 40 percent of volunteers were able to complete their planned volunteer work (Kurth et al., 2021). By contrast, 7,209 individuals volunteered abroad in 2019, which means there was a drop of almost two-thirds in 2020 (Kurth et al., 2020). Despite this decrease, the thematic focus of the majority of volunteer organizations still rests in education and social engagement, as it did in 2019. However, peacebuilding and environmental causes did see slight increases in their total share of volunteer opportunities (1.9% and 2.1%, respectively) (Kurth et al., 2021).

According to the 2019 Volunteering in Germany Survey, 57 percent of volunteers reported that they used the Internet for their volunteering roles in 2019, and only 2.6 percent reported that their entire volunteering experience was online (Simonson et al., 2022). Interestingly, there seems to be no clear indication if, or to what extent, the cross-border

volunteering that did take place in 2020 was either online or made possible by switching online. For those that were able to complete their volunteer assignments, the vast majority (roughly 78%) were within Europe. The regions with the most cancelled volunteer positions were Latin America, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific regions, which accounted for 86 percent of the total cancellations (Kurth et al., 2021).

SOUTH KOREA

According to the Korea NGO Council for Overseas Development Cooperation, based on the responses of 126 nonprofit organizations, 185,012 volunteers worked in 119 of the surveyed organizations in 2021 (KCOC, 2021). Due to the impacts of COVID-19, the number of volunteers sent abroad dropped when compared with pre-pandemic levels: 28 nonprofit organizations in South Korea recruited and deployed 1,157 trained volunteers in 52 countries in 2021, significantly less than in 2019 (89 organizations, 53 countries, 3,589 people). Countries in Asia received the largest number of deployed cross-border volunteers (49.5%), followed by Africa (26.9%), Latin America (4.2%), the Middle East (4.5%), and Europe (2.5%), in addition to a separate “multi-continent” category (12.4%). By country, the largest number of volunteers were sent to Indonesia (7.8%), Vietnam (7.1%), Egypt (6.1%), Cambodia (5.4%), and Tanzania (4.8%).

SPAIN

La Coordinadora de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo (The Spanish Development NGO Coordinator) provides data on its members volunteering habits, both domestic and cross-border. Their goal is to connect groups and organizations committed to international development and solidarity, humanitarian assistance, and the promotion of human rights. Their most recent report on the development NGO sector in Spain contains data from 71 organizations and 17 regional coordinators. In 2020, a total of 18,380 individuals from Spain engaged in short-term volunteering both domestically and abroad with these organizations, a decrease of just over 2,000 volunteers compared to 2018 (La Coordinadora de Organizaciones para el Desarrollo, 2021).

The most recent version of the report noted the “feminization” of volunteers in Spain, as 71 percent were women. It is unclear whether the collected data on cross-border volunteering mainly originated in the early months of 2020, before cross-border travel was restricted in Spain, but 40 percent of the organizations offered volunteer opportunities abroad at some point in 2020.

Still, only 615 volunteers traveled outside Spain, far fewer than the 4,140 volunteer in 2018. Tierra de Hombres, a development organization focused on children’s rights and child-maternal healthcare, facilitated 70.6 percent of the cross-border volunteers in 2020, the most out of all partner organizations. Among volunteers who served abroad, 62 percent were 30-64 years old. As previously mentioned, the number of women volunteers has risen in the last two years, and 65 percent of the cross-border volunteers in 2020 were women.

Among the 71 organizations, there were volunteer programs in the Americas (86 programs), Africa (58), the Middle East (11), Asia (9), and Europe (4). The top five countries with the most volunteer projects were Bolivia and Guatemala (12 projects each), followed by El Salvador (10), Honduras (8), and Senegal (7), though the report did not publish the size of the volunteer cohorts by location. Additionally, the programs focused on a variety of topics, the most common of which were education, gender equality, human rights, health, and children.

UNITED STATES

Since 2016, there has been no update to the Volunteering and Civic Life Supplement on volunteering abroad or volunteering for international organizations alone in the United States, nor has any new study provided data since 2020 on the aggregate number of volunteers for international causes domestically or abroad. The most recent data comes from a study which reports that between 2004-14, approximately 800,000 to 1.1 million Americans participated in cross-border volunteering each year (Lough, 2020).

One major provider of US cross-border volunteers is the Peace Corps, a government-sponsored program that deploys volunteers to more than 60 countries operating across a range of thematic areas. Before the COVID-19 pandemic forced the evacuation of volunteers in March 2020, there were 6,893 Peace Corps participants stationed abroad in FY2020, down from 7,334 in 2019 (Peace Corps, 2020; Peace Corps, 2019). Africa was the most popular destination for volunteers (45% of volunteers), followed by Latin America (19%), Eastern Europe and Central Asia (13%), Asia (13%), the Caribbean Islands (5%), the Middle East & North Africa (3%), and the Pacific Islands (3%). Volunteers served in a wide range of sectors, from education (41% of volunteers) to health (21%), agriculture (11%), youth in development (10%), community economic development (9%), environment (7%), and Peace Corps Response (2%) (Peace Corps, 2020).

After the pandemic halted usual Peace Corps operations, some volunteer activities shifted online. In 2021, the Peace Corps launched the “Virtual Service Pilot”, through which volunteers served 5-20 hours per week working on a project with a partner in a host country. By the end of FY2021, 240 returned volunteers participated in the program with organizations in 27 countries (Peace Corps, 2021). The Peace Corps began to send volunteers abroad again in March 2022, but only 749 volunteers were stationed abroad by the end of FY2022—just about 11 percent of the total number of volunteers in 2020 (Peace Corps, 2022).




Other Cross-Border Resource Flows

A. Official Development Assistance

Thirty-eight out of the 47 countries included in this report had available data on ODA from the OECD, which totaled nearly USD 180 billion in 2020.³¹ This includes ODA data from Qatar, which did not have available data in the 2018. Compared with data from 2018, ODA saw a 1 percent decrease. When grouping the countries by income groups established by the World Bank, the ODA from all 32 high-income countries was USD 166 billion in 2020. Of this, nearly 90 percent (over USD 161 billion) came from the 26 DAC members, a five percent decrease compared to 2018. The five upper-middle income countries contributed nearly USD 14 billion. The one lower-middle income country with estimated data on ODA, India, contributed USD 209 million. For seven countries (all upper-middle income countries plus Chile and India) there was no available 2020 data for ODA, and therefore the latest available estimates from either 2018 or 2019 were gathered and adjusted for inflation into 2020 US dollars.

Figure 12 shows the total ODA outflows from the 38 countries with available data. The largest eight providers of ODA remained the same when compared to 2018: the United States (USD 36 billion), Germany (USD 29 billion), the United Kingdom (USD 19 billion), Japan (USD 16 billion), France (USD 14 billion), Türkiye (USD 8 billion), Sweden (USD 6 billion), the Netherlands (USD 5 billion). Canada and China gave less than the Netherlands, each one approximately at USD 5 billion. Combined ODA from the top five countries, which are all high-income, amounted to 68.3 percent of aggregated ODA from the 32 high-income countries included in the report, 63.0 percent of the total ODA contributions from all 38 countries, and 70.2 percent of all 26 DAC countries. Türkiye contributed the most ODA out of the five upper-middle income countries, with more than USD 8 billion, and additionally ranked 6th out of all 38 countries.

FIGURE 12. NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BY COUNTRY, 2020 (in millions of inflation-adjusted 2020 US dollars)



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: OECD

Notes: HICs: High-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle income countries; LMICs: Lower-middle income countries


³¹ Of the 9 countries that did not have ODA estimates, 5 were upper-middle income countries, 3 were lower-middle income and 1 was low-income.

Figure 13 displays each donor country's total ODA relative to their gross national income (GNI). Compared to 2018, the top two countries remained the same—Türkiye and Sweden—though in 2020 they were tied for 1st with approximately 1.14 percent each. Norway, again ranking 3rd among all countries and 2nd among high-income countries, reported 1.11 percent. Of the upper-middle income countries, Türkiye contributed by far the most ODA as a share of GNI (1.14%), as the remaining four countries contributed between 0.02-0.04 percent of GNI. Among the top ten countries with the highest ODA across all income groups in 2020, six remained in the top 10 when evaluating ODA as a share of GNI. When ranked by the share of ODA as a share of GNI, these countries are Türkiye, Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and France. Compared with 2018, the only newcomer to this sub-group is France.

Of the 38 countries in the 2023 GPT with data on ODA, only seven attained the 0.70 percent OECD target for government aid as a percentage of a country's GNI, and all except Türkiye were high-income DAC countries. Listed from largest ODA as a share of GNI to smallest, these countries were Türkiye, Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, Germany, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. Compared with 2018, only the United Arab Emirates moved out of this subgroup. Among all upper-middle income, lower-middle income, and emerging countries, Türkiye alone surpassed the OECD 0.70 target.

The seven countries that met the 0.70 percent target contributed nearly USD 70 billion in total. In 1969, the Pearson Commission on International Development convened by the World Bank had proposed that countries aim for ODA to reach 0.70 percent as a share of their gross national product (GDP) by 1975, or 1980 at the latest, a resolution which was adopted by the UN a year later.³² As a long-term goal, DAC member countries agreed to this, except for Switzerland and the United States. In 1993, due to the updated System of National Accounts, GNI replaced GDP in this measurement framework. However, as noted above, only six of the 26 DAC members included in this report, and one non-DAC member, achieved this in 2020. Critics note several factors that have dissuaded DAC members from achieving the 0.70 ODA as a share of GNI. First, this benchmark is built upon a dated growth model from the mid-20th century during a time which private financial outflows were far lower. Since the 1970s, these have grown dramatically, and currently are key inflows to developing countries. Secondly, there are concerns whether low-income countries would have the capacity to absorb the magnitude of the flows, if donor countries were to achieve the 0.70 target (Clemens & Moss, 2005).³³

FIGURE 13. NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AS A SHARE OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME BY COUNTRY, 2020



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: ODA from the OECD; GNI from the World Bank

Notes: HICs: High-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle income countries; LMICs: Lower-middle income countries

³² The history of the 0.70 percent target is available at: <http://www.oecd.org/development/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm>

³³ Please see the 2005 working paper by Michael Clemens and Todd J. Moss for a detailed paper on the 0.70 percent target (Clemens & Moss, 2005).

B. Remittances

Remittances tend to flow counter-cyclically. During times of economic downturns and social crises, migrants often continue or even increase their remittances to their home country, which means this is a stable financial flow (Frankel 2010). Remittances also go directly to the migrant's family members in their country of origin. They help cover basic human needs such as food, health care, and housing. Furthermore, remittances can be used to ensure access to vital supplies like clean water and electricity, as well as community development.

In 2020, the sum of all official remittance³⁴ outflows originating from the 47 countries included in this report totaled USD 590 billion, an increase of 19 percent from USD 496 billion in 2018. Remittances remained the largest of the four resource flows

analyzed in this report, as it was in 2018. The resilience of remittances can be attributed to their counter-cyclical nature and to stimulus packages from host-country governments which resulted in favorable economic conditions. Additionally, COVID-19 restrictions led to the increase of more formal remittance sending channels, which could also be tracked by governments (Kpodar et al., 2022). Of the USD 590 billion, migrants in Uganda, the only low-income country in this report, remitted USD 806 million; migrants in the four lower-middle income countries sent USD 10.4 billion; and those in the 10 upper-middle income countries sent above USD 20 billion. Migrants in the 32 high-income countries remitted just over USD 559 billion, and 81 percent of that (over USD 452 billion) came from DAC member states.




³⁴ The World Bank's estimation of remittances is based on data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and central banks. The estimates include two main components: "compensation of employees" and "personal transfers." Flows through channels other than banks, such as money transfer operators, post offices, mobile money transfers, and other emerging channels, are often not adequately captured. For detailed methodologies, see World Bank's Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016, available at <https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-remittances-factbook-2016>

REMITTANCES TO ALL COUNTRIES

When compared with the data in 2018, the rankings of countries where migrants remitted the largest gross amount remained quite similar (see Figure 14). Among the high-income countries, the top five largest remitters in 2020 were the United States (USD 191 billion), Saudi Arabia (USD 45 billion), the United Arab Emirates (USD 43 billion), Germany (USD 36 billion), and the United Kingdom (USD 32 billion), the same top five as in 2018, although the UK and Germany switched rankings. Of these countries, three are DAC members (the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany). The other two (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) are emerging markets.

Among the 10 upper-middle income countries, the highest number of remittances in 2020 came from migrants in Türkiye, as in 2018, at just over USD 5 billion. South Africa ranked 2nd in this group, displacing China and Mexico when compared to 2018, at nearly USD 4 billion, and Mexico ranked 3rd, at just over USD 3 billion. Among the four lower-middle income countries, migrants in India remitted the most by far, above USD 8 billion, and migrants in Nigeria, the 2nd highest in this income group, remitted over USD 1 billion, again the same rankings as in 2018. Migrants in Uganda, the sole country in the low-income group included in this report, remitted USD 0.8 billion, more than Kenya and Tanzania, which are both lower-middle income countries.

FIGURE 14. REMITTANCE OUTFLOWS TO ALL COUNTRIES BY SENDING COUNTRY, 2020 (in millions of US dollars)



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: World Bank


Notes: HICs: High-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle income countries; LMICs: Lower-middle income countries; LICs: Low-income countries

The top three countries with the largest remittances as a share of GNI in 2020 across income groups were all high-income Middle Eastern countries with emerging markets. This is consistent with the findings from 2018 as well, though the 2nd and 3rd rankings shifted. The United Arab Emirates again ranked at the top at 12.07 percent, increasing its remittance outflows as a percentage of GNI since 2018. Qatar ranked 2nd at 8.19 percent and Saudi Arabia ranked 3rd with 6.27 percent. As in 2018, among the high-income countries Luxembourg ranked 4th, but the share of remittances as a percentage of GNI increased. Among the 10 upper-middle income countries, the highest

share of remittances relative to GNI came from Serbia (4.68%). Remittances from migrants in Kenya accounted for 0.70 percent of GNI, the highest of the four lower-middle income countries. Uganda, the only low-income country included in this report, ranked 7th out of all 47 countries, at 2.19 percent.

Of the 10 countries across all income groups with the largest remittances by volume, four remained in the top 10 when comparing remittances as a share of GNI—Canada, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States (Figure 15).

FIGURE 15. REMITTANCE OUTFLOWS TO ALL COUNTRIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME BY SENDING COUNTRY, 2020



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: World Bank


Notes: HICs: High-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle income countries; LMICs: Lower-middle income countries; LICs: Low-income countries

REMITTANCES TO LOW- AND MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES

Of the USD 590 billion in remittances that migrants around the world sent back to their home countries in 2020, over a quarter (27%) were sent to high-income countries. The remaining remittances (USD 434 billion) went to low- and middle-income countries. Of that, a majority (95%) came from migrants in high-income countries. The percentage breakdown of where the remittances went to and came from is almost identical to the findings reported for 2018 in the *2020 GPT*.

The top three countries with the largest amounts of remittances by volume (the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) remained the same when excluding high-income countries from the recipients. Canada replaced Germany and ranked 4th, while the United Kingdom remained 5th. The three countries with the largest remittances as a share of GNI remained the same as well, as it did in the previous report. Uganda (which ranked 7th when looking at total remittances as a share of GNI) ranked 4th, followed closely by Montenegro. Figures 16 and 17 present the 10 countries with the largest remittances channeled to low- and middle-income countries.


FIGURE 16. REMITTANCE OUTFLOWS TO LOW- AND MIDDLE- INCOME COUNTRIES BY TOP 10 SENDING COUNTRIES ACROSS INCOME GROUPS, 2020 (in millions of US dollars)



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: World Bank

FIGURE 17. REMITTANCE OUTFLOWS TO LOW- AND MIDDLE- INCOME COUNTRIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME BY TOP 10 SENDING COUNTRIES ACROSS INCOME GROUPS, 2020



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: World Bank

Spotlight on Diaspora Philanthropy

Diaspora philanthropy is not a new phenomenon, but a consistent rise in global migration and Internet technology means that it is an increasingly important subject of study (CAF America, 2015). A form of diaspora diplomacy, diaspora philanthropy is a diverse subject about which little comprehensive research exists, partially due to the opaque nature of the term. There are various interpretations of what qualifies as diaspora philanthropy because the “amalgamation of two highly contested and controversial concepts, diaspora and philanthropy, is difficult” (Aikins & Russell, 2022, p. 182). The International Organization on Migration (IOM, 2019) defines diasporas as:

[m]igrants or descendants of migrants whose identity and sense of belonging, either real or symbolic, have been shaped by their migration experience and background. They maintain links with their homelands, and to each other, based on a shared sense of history, identity, or mutual experiences in the destination country. (Sironi et al., 2019, p. 494)

While remittances are money or goods sent by migrants to their friends or relatives in their home countries, diaspora philanthropy encompasses “money, goods, volunteer labor, knowledge and skills, and other assets donated for the social benefit of a community broader than one’s family members, in a country or region where there is a population with whom the donor(s) have ancestral ties” (Flanigan 2017, p. 494).³⁵

Recent Research on Diaspora Philanthropy

Because of the unique and interconnected relationships of diaspora communities with their countries of origin and the communities and governments in their countries of residence, research on diaspora philanthropy is covered from a diverse range of disciplines such as psychology, cultural studies, religion, and of course philanthropy. Some recent literature covers the Israeli-based Filipino migrant community’s philanthropy during COVID-19 (Sabar et al., 2022); an analysis of how universities in sub-Saharan Africa build relationships with the African diaspora in the United States, focusing on philanthropic but also recognizing intellectual and professional contributions (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2020); the intersection of diaspora diplomacy and philanthropy, specifically how a social media campaign aimed at garnering philanthropic support from the Indian diaspora abroad framed the diaspora as both “territorial and extra-territorial” actors which can be used for domestic and international policy goals (Dickinson, 2020, p. 774); what motivates the Jain diaspora community in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore to donate, and what cultural meaning these donations have (Shah, 2019); and how small immigrant-owned businesses can be a catalyst for diaspora philanthropy, based on a case study of a small business-owner from Wuhan in New York City during COVID-19 (Chen, 2021). These studies often focus on a specific diaspora community, but they provide insights into the depth and breadth of diaspora philanthropy globally.

³⁵ For more information on this definition of philanthropy and remittances, please see the “What does the report measure” section.

Generalizations of the ecosystem of diaspora philanthropy are difficult because each community has unique histories with the country they reside in and the country that they or their ancestors came from. Yet, a common thread in existing research is that diaspora communities around the world engage in various types of philanthropic actions.

Existing research estimates giving by specific diaspora groups. An exploratory study commissioned by the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy and the British Council in Pakistan (2019) revealed that the Pakistani diaspora community in the United Kingdom donates an estimated GBP 1.25 billion annually to philanthropic causes in Pakistan (GBP 0.7 billion) and the United Kingdom (GBP 0.6 billion), which includes monetary contributions, in-kind donations, and volunteering. A separate study by Catalyst Balkans (2022b) estimated that between 2015-2021, Kosovo's diaspora community donated EUR 6.5 million, mainly toward the cause of education. Notably, not all diaspora organizations focus their philanthropic efforts exclusively in their country of origin. For instance, Indiaspora is "a network of global Indian origin leaders" which garnered USD 15 million for COVID-19 relief efforts both in India and the United States along with its partners (Give, 2022).

During turbulent times in their home country or region, diaspora communities mobilize by donating funds themselves and by raising both funds and awareness (EUDiF & Shabaka, 2021). Because of their close ties with affected communities and knowledge of the situation on the ground, they are motivated and knowledgeable fundraisers. In 2022, when severe flooding in Pakistan due to climate change affected at least 33 million and killed nearly 2,000 people, members of the diaspora and their organizations in Canada and the United Kingdom worked to provide necessary relief to the impacted areas (Center for Disaster Philanthropy, 2022; Khan, 2022). As an example, the South Asian Visual Arts Network organized an auction for which artists from the South Asian diaspora raised USD 85,000 by auctioning off their work in a "women- and queer-led initiative," and subsequently donated the funds to four "women-led, on-ground organizations" (Nayyar, 2022). African diaspora populations throughout Europe have consistently provided humanitarian aid to their respective home countries through a variety of channels, such as donations, volunteering, and knowledge exchange (Africa-Europe Diaspora Development Platform & Shabaka, 2021). In the United States, the Puerto Rican diaspora provided necessary aid during the aftermath of Hurricane Maria in 2017 and repeated these efforts when Hurricane Fiona hit the island in 2022 (NPR, 2022).

Since the Euromaidan protests in 2013-2014, the Ukrainian diaspora has been consistently mobilizing support within Europe, and global attention has turned to the diaspora community once again since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The Ukrainian diaspora has been a key player in the resettlement of the millions of refugees fleeing the war (Hincu, 2022). Interestingly, a case study suggested that diaspora communities seeking external support from outside their own communities during times of crisis in their home countries or regions were more successful when the crisis was caused by "natural disasters and complex emergencies, rather than political crises or conflicts" (Shabaka, 2021, p. 62).

What's Next? The Future of Diaspora Philanthropy

Mapping diaspora-owned philanthropic organizations is a vital step to begin tracking the scope of diaspora philanthropy, since many of the donations from diasporas are made through such channels (IOM, 2020). In the last three decades, there have been concerted efforts to understand and garner the strength of diasporas, but there remains a lack of comprehensive data due to different definitions of what constitutes a diaspora as well as a dearth of consistently tracked data (Global Migration Data Portal, 2020). The International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2020) released a report which gives host governments and authorities advice on how to accurately track the financial contributions sent by diaspora populations to their home countries that do not qualify as remittances. Economic contributions can be direct, such as philanthropy or capital market investment, or indirect, such as skills and knowledge transfer (IOM, 2020). Philanthropy, trade, and portfolio investments are types of contributions that are challenging to track.

Overall, there is a consensus that diaspora philanthropy is a key partner for the future of development, as well as valuable discussions on the need for residence countries to step up. Senior fellow and co-founder of the Migration Policy Institute, Kathleen Newland (2022) applauded the work that origin countries have done to incorporate diaspora populations as development partners and opined that “few donor countries... have followed suit with sustained, scaled-up programs and policies to encourage and assist diaspora populations in contributing to development in their homelands” (p. 2). The report offers recommendations for destination countries to promote diaspora engagement with development initiatives in their countries of origin. For example, countries should internalize and put into practice the development solutions that diasporas may offer.

Analyzing how COVID-19 shifted attention onto diaspora communities, the Executive Director of the Africa-Europe Diaspora Development Platform, Carine Nsoudou, explained “the onus is now on residence countries’ policymakers and decision makers to harness the momentum created by the pandemic and work towards making diaspora organizations’ inclusion in development circles the ‘new normal’” (IOM, 2021, p. 43). The Global Diaspora Summit (2022) culminated in “A Future Agenda of Action of Global Diaspora Engagement” known as the Dublin Declaration, which will hopefully bring to fruition recommendations posed by the aforementioned reports. Recognizing the role that diasporas play in the achievement of humanitarian development, such as UN Sustainable Development Goals, the aim is for the Dublin Declaration “to institutionalize and operationalize such diaspora capital across policies, programmes, and partnerships in a coherent and consistent framework” (IOM, 2022, p. 1).

Especially during times of crisis, diaspora communities rally and provide philanthropic relief to their home countries. Yet, there are no systematic data tracking efforts, especially in destination countries, to report on the depth and breadth of diaspora philanthropy. Until governments and practitioners around the world put into place measures that make systematic tracking of diaspora philanthropy feasible without becoming burdensome, we cannot quantify the scale of diasporas’ generosity. Additionally, destination countries must work on creating an enabling environment for these vital partners to be integrated into development initiatives (Newland, 2022).


C. Private Capital Investment

Among the 47 countries included in this report, 22 had available data on private capital outflows in 2020 and two (Australia and Denmark) had data from 2019. PCI is an important funding source in international development which grew substantially since the 1990s. However, due to the combined effects of the global economic recession, a depreciation in the value of investments, and reduced levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on capital flows (UNCTAD, 2021) PCI of the 24 countries covered in this report dropped 100 percent from USD 112 billion in 2018 to USD 0.4 billion in 2020. Of the four outflows covered in this report, PCI was therefore the smallest financial flow by far.

All 24 countries with data on PCI were in the high-income group and were OECD DAC members with the exception of Türkiye, an upper-middle income and non-DAC country. Five of these 24 countries, the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, South Korea, and Türkiye, were emerging markets.

As shown in Figure 18, Japan had the highest private capital outflows at USD 18.7 billion, followed by Germany at USD 14.7 billion and Spain at USD 11.1 billion. Six countries—Austria, Canada, Portugal, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States—had negative values in 2020. The United States, traditionally the highest source of private capital flows, was the lowest private investor in 2020, as it was in 2018, with a net flow of negative USD 68.7 billion. The high negative value in 2020 for the United States was over fifteen times larger than the 2nd-lowest negative investor, Canada, which had negative USD 4.5 billion, suggesting that the sharp fall in US private market flows was a major contributor to the low total amount. The United States also had a negative value in 2018, followed by a positive value in 2019, before declining again in 2020.

FIGURE 18. PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS BY COUNTRY, 2020 (in millions of US dollars)



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*


Data: OEDC

Notes: HICs: High-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle income countries

Of the 10 countries with the largest PCI, 9 remained in the top 10 when comparing PCI as a share of GNI. Nearly all the rankings of the top ten shift, with the exception of Sweden which ranked 9th in both cases. Hungary, an emerging market, had the largest PCI as a percentage of GNI at 1.98 percent (see Figure 19),

tripling its private capital outflows since 2018 (0.60%) and moving from 6th to 1st in the ranking. Spain had the 2nd largest share at 0.87 percent, a slight increase from 2018. Another emerging market, South Korea, had the 3rd largest PCI as a percentage of GNI at 0.65 percent.

FIGURE 19. PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS NATIONAL INCOME BY COUNTRY, 2020



Source: Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023 *Global Philanthropy Tracker*

Data: OECD

Notes: HICs: High-income countries; UMICs: Upper-middle income countries

Looking Ahead

The *2023 Global Philanthropy Tracker* provides a snapshot of how nations, organizations, and individuals responded to a volatile time in recent history, namely the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Additionally, the increasing effects of global climate change, natural disasters, civil unrest, and wars, as well as numerous crises have called for international collaboration and immediate humanitarian responses and put philanthropy on the global stage to provide immediate relief and long-term development for societies across cultures. Now, we can look to this snapshot with a critical eye, answering the following questions: Have our collective philanthropic responses achieved what we would have liked? Where do increases in philanthropic outflows point to an intentional response by citizens and philanthropic organizations to help others abroad, and where do we see decreases—and what may have caused them? How can we improve and promote cross-border giving and volunteering?

While looking back and measuring the progress of cross-border philanthropy, it is also crucial to look ahead.

We collectively find ourselves facing increasingly complex and interconnected crises in the forms of climate change, migration, economy, and health as well as a shrinking space for civil society. What do we need to be ready when the next complex emergency arrives? Technological advancement and digitalization have led to new and emerging ways of giving that have the potential to facilitate cross-border philanthropy, and to encourage generosity and solidarity that transcend cultures, religions, and national borders.

In this decade, technology has continued rapidly advancing. Such advancements, the spread of digitalization, and numerous global incidents, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and the earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria have spurred the use of new ways of giving, including contactless giving, crowdfunding, crypto donations, and digital workplace giving (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023). These giving vehicles are likely to become more popular in the coming years and can also revolutionize cross-border philanthropy.

Crowdfunding: one of the most rapidly growing giving vehicles

Crowdfunding is a digital giving vehicle defined as a “raising of capital from a large and diverse pool of donors via online platforms” (Davies, 2014). Charitable crowdfunding is usually initiated by individuals on specific online platforms to support a charitable activity (Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2021). Part of the reason that charitable crowdfunding has found a large audience of donors is that it is more informal, allows for quick donations, and supports smaller nonprofits in their work (Ackerman & Bergdoll, 2021).

Interest in crowdfunding campaigns was heightened by funding needs during the COVID-19 pandemic. For instance, GoFundMe hosted over 175,000 campaigns, which were established between January 1 and July 31, 2020 bringing more than USD 416 million of donations towards the fight against the pandemic (Igra et al., 2021). More recently, the war in Ukraine has shown further use of crowdfunding techniques. For example, the Ukrainian government established its own fundraising site through the National Bank of Ukraine, which is explicitly not a charity fund or NGO, but had still gathered over UAH 920 million (approximately USD 25 million) for humanitarian needs between February 24, 2022 and January 2, 2023 (National Bank of Ukraine, 2023). Crowdfunding has also played a key role in getting financial support to victims of the devastating earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria.

As the use of online giving increases across the world, the future for crowdfunding seems promising. However, while such resources are finding their way into mainstream news on how to help victims, caution is still required due to scam attempts through fake crowdfunding campaigns (Campisi, 2023).

Crypto donations: a possible change-maker in cross-border philanthropy

Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, a host of other cryptocurrencies³⁶ have emerged and paved the way for a new type of philanthropy. However, cryptocurrency has a significant fraud risk, and it can be an extremely volatile asset (Mayer Hoffman McCann P.C., 2022). In 2022, crypto markets experienced a steep price decline, thus many philanthropic organizations faced financial losses. Nevertheless, crypto donations seem to remain an emerging and popular way of charitable giving, providing philanthropic organizations different opportunities for fundraising (The Giving Block, 2022). Although in some countries, crypto philanthropy has emerged as an innovative method of giving, in other countries, unclear or restrictive regulations of cryptocurrencies make crypto donations difficult or illegal.

Blockchain is increasingly used in philanthropy through cryptocurrency fundraising and many philanthropic organizations have been established with the purpose of crypto giving. The Giving Block, a digital platform that facilitates cryptocurrency donations, recorded a total donation of USD 69.6 million, a 1,558 percent increase from 2020 to 2021 (The Giving Block, 2021). The Philcoin project, one of the first nonprofits to institutionalize crypto philanthropy, has leveraged blockchain technology to establish a network that will facilitate cross-border crypto donations through its website and app (Philcoin, 2022).³⁷ Simultaneously, some local communities, such as those in El Salvador and South Africa, have harnessed the power of nonprofits and crypto donations to establish Bitcoin-based circular economies aimed at reducing poverty and improving financial literacy in these areas (Harper, 2020; Munawa, 2022).

Campaigns in response to international crises such as the war in Ukraine, and the recent earthquakes in Türkiye and Syria have emerged to allow donors to give with various cryptocurrencies. The war in Ukraine drew attention to cryptocurrency contributions, as an increasing number of individuals around the world desired to give immediate support to Ukrainians through crypto-asset donation campaigns (Roohi, 2022; Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2023). According to reports from Chainalysis, Ukraine has received USD 70 million worth of cryptocurrency donations since February 2022, while almost USD 6 million in donations to earthquake victims in Türkiye and Syria through cryptocurrency have already been made (Chainalysis Team, 2023a, 2023b). In both situations, the country's previous policies influenced how cryptocurrency has been used. While Ukraine has actively supported the use of such assets for donations and provided clear channels for giving, Türkiye prohibits any direct or indirect payment with crypto assets, making it harder to send and receive such donations (Onar & Subaşı, 2023).

Moving funds across borders is complex and often hindered by the countries' regulatory environment, especially in cases of emerging giving vehicles. Beyond an enabling environment for cross-border philanthropy, it is also necessary to know where the funds are most needed, how these funds can arrive to their beneficiaries in the most effective way, and what impact these funds achieve in the long term.

To have a better understanding about the global role of philanthropy and enhance the effectivity of cross-border giving, collective and comparable data on the environment for cross-border philanthropy and the scale and scope of cross-border giving will remain crucial in the next years and decades. Such data are what the Global Philanthropy Indices—the *Global Philanthropy Environment Index* and the *Global Philanthropy Tracker*—aim to provide for practitioners, policymakers, and researchers to jointly enhance global philanthropy worldwide.

³⁶ The underlying technology behind cryptocurrencies is blockchain, which is a decentralized, secure network that facilitates peer-to-peer transactions. Blockchain operates without the need for a central authority such as banks or other financial institutions, which enables two parties to exchange money over the blockchain network without the usual transaction costs (Liquid, n.d.).

³⁷ See Philcoin's website here: <https://philcoin.io/>

Methodology

The *Global Philanthropy Tracker* measures the extent and magnitude of global cross-border philanthropic outflows of 47 countries and economies. By focusing on all cross-border philanthropy—not just philanthropy for development purposes—it offers a holistic view of worldwide philanthropic outflows. The *2023 GPT* provides updated estimates based on data from 2020 or the most recent year with available data.

In this report, *philanthropic outflow* refers to a) the sum of charitable financial contributions sent by donors when the donor (individuals, foundations, corporations, or faith-based organizations) and the beneficiary (individuals, philanthropic organizations, or intermediary organizations) are located in different countries; or b) giving within a country to domestic philanthropic organizations that focus on broad categories of international causes, such as foreign affairs, humanitarian assistance, international relations, promotion of international understanding, and international solidarity.

The 2020 report expanded the scope of philanthropic outflows to include contributions from all countries and toward all countries in support of any charitable cause, as long as data is available. By utilizing this inclusive methodology, the *GPT* covers a wide scope of cross-border philanthropy, rather than focusing solely on private donations for development and philanthropy flowing from developed countries toward developing countries. Additionally, country-level data are presented by countries' income group as defined by the World Bank using gross national income (GNI) per capita. Based on GNI per capita, the World Bank classifies countries into four income groups: low, lower-middle, upper-middle, and high (as shown in Table 1).

DATA

The four resource flows measured in this report are: cross-border philanthropy, official development assistance (ODA), remittances, and private capital investment (PCI). To allow for comparison, all monetary data are adjusted to 2020 US dollars. Below are descriptions of the sources for each of the four resource flows.

Unless the country-level sources provided conversions of the original currency to US dollars, all non-US currencies were converted into USD using the historical market exchange rates of

December 31 in the given year.³⁸ Finally, inflation was adjusted into 2020 USD using a GDP deflator from the Federal Reserve.³⁹

Philanthropic outflows

Data on philanthropic outflows from the 47 countries was generally identified using one of the two following sources:

1. PUBLICLY AVAILABLE SOURCES

Of the 47 countries covered in the *GPT 2023*, 38 had publicly accessible sources which tracked philanthropic outflows. A variety of actors have published this data, by using diverse research methods to collect, analyze, and report on philanthropic outflows. These actors include government agencies (such as central statistical offices), umbrella and membership organizations, universities and private research centers, international organizations (such as OECD), and industry reports from private corporations. Some countries lacked aggregate estimates on philanthropic outflows. For these countries, the School gathered publicly available data from the annual reports of philanthropic organizations and provided an estimate of the philanthropic outflows of those countries.

2. DATA SHARED BY LOCAL RESEARCH PARTNERS AROUND THE WORLD

For 8 of the 47 countries, there is minimal data or information in English. In these cases, the School worked with local expert organizations to identify and analyze cross-border philanthropy data. The School partnered with several organizations to collect and analyze data on cross-border philanthropy for the United States in order to provide more complete information.

Of the 47 countries, only 28 countries have updated data on philanthropic outflows that are comparable to data from previous years. The country-level comparisons over time are impossible for the remaining 19 countries. Specifically, 11 countries offer updated data on philanthropic outflows, but their data are not directly comparable to those from previous years included in the *2020 GPT* due to various reasons, such as different sources that are used or major changes made to the methodologies by data providers. Eight countries did not have updated data on philanthropic outflows since the *2020 GPT* was published, so data from the *2020 GPT* have been used for these countries, after adjusting for inflation.

³⁸ <https://www.xe.com/currencytables>

³⁹ <https://fred.stlouisfed.org>

Few countries track and publish data on cross-border volunteering and there is no universally followed approach for monetizing volunteer time among the countries that do, therefore it is not included in the quantitative estimates for countries this report. Instead, cross-border volunteering estimates are covered in a separate section of the report.

Due to the lack of an internationally universal method in data tracking, the definitions and measurement of data on cross-border philanthropy vary across countries. For example, the inclusion of in-kind donations largely depends on the original sources of the data for each country. Various forms of giving may not be included in the estimates for some countries, such as smaller grants made by foundations, or donations through online platforms or mobile messages, depending on specific methodologies used by the sources of the data. Cross-border giving made through religious organizations is not measured in many countries. In some countries, government funding to philanthropic organizations is an important source of revenue. The School excluded government funding for private philanthropic organizations, when possible, while calculating countries' philanthropic outflows.

Both the availability and quality of data on cross-border philanthropic outflows differ country to country among the 47 countries in this report. To support the improvement of data quality and availability, the *2020 GPT* introduced a “data quality scoring system” to track and evaluate the quality of the philanthropic outflow data presented in this report, which has been updated for the *2023 GPT* data (see [Appendix A](#)). The scoring system is as follows:

++++

High-quality aggregate data, often collected by government or a central agency. The data provide specific giving values to specific categories of organizations and/or donations.

+++

High-quality data, providing aggregate information of donations based on high-quality surveys. Further imputation is necessary to develop estimates on philanthropic outflows.

++

Aggregate data are lacking, but data were collected through examining and coding relevant organizations' annual reports.

+

Data are extremely sparse or uneven. Estimates are based on either multiple and excessive imputations or a single, very small source of data.

Country-specific methodologies with details on the data sources and quality for each country in this report are included in [Appendix A](#).

Official Development Assistance (ODA)

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) collected, verified, and publicly published ODA data for 38 of the 47 countries in this report. Seven countries did not have data for 2020, so data for 2018 or 2019, whichever is the most recent year with available data, are used instead. OECD data are based on the official reports of government aid by 31 members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and about 80 development cooperation partners, comprised of other countries, multilateral organizations, and private foundations. The new grant equivalent measure of ODA, which was first applied to 2018 data, is now the standard methodology for reporting ODA. For detailed definition and methodologies, visit: <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm>.

Remittances

The World Bank published remittances outflow estimates from 2020 for all 47 countries in the report, which is based on data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and central banks. The estimates are based on two key aspects: “compensation of employees” and “personal transfers.” Because remittances sent via informal channels and some formal channels are often not traceable, remittance outflow data is believed to be underestimated. Methodology details are provided in the World Bank's *Migration and Remittances Factbook 2016*, available at <https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-remittances-factbook-2016>.

Private Capital Investment (PCI)

PCI outflow data from 24 of the 47 countries are provided by the OECD. Data from 2020 are included for 22 of these countries, and for the two countries that did not have 2020 data, 2019 data are used instead. Per the OECD, private flows at market terms are comprised of foreign direct investment, international bank lending, bond lending, and other securities (including equities). In this report, the foreign direct investment value, which is a component of PCI, includes flows to aid-recipient countries only. Specifics on PCI data are available in the OECD's Glossary of Statistical Terms: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-glossary-of-statistical-terms_9789264055087-en.

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Acknowledgments

This research was supported by funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. The findings and conclusions contained within are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions or policies of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation.

This project was funded in part by the John Templeton Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.

We are grateful to our research partners who conducted extensive original research, including data collection and analysis, for the 2023 GPT:

Candid: *United States*

Catalyst Balkans: *Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia*

China Foundation Center: *China*

DataLake, LLC: *United States*

Sung-Ju Kim, PhD, North Carolina State University: *South Korea*

The Center on Philanthropy, The Beautiful Foundation: *South Korea*

We are grateful for the following contributors who made it possible to provide the executive summary for the 2023 GPT in five additional languages:

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<u>Arabic</u>	Julie Herkal	Samir Abu Rumman, PhD <i>Research Scholar at Princeton University</i> <i>Research Consultant at UMR</i>
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<u>German</u>	Edward Vaughan	Jodie van't Hoff <i>Independent Reviewer</i>
<u>Korean</u>	YoonJoo Jang <i>Researcher, The Beautiful Foundation</i>	Sung-Ju Kim, PhD <i>North Carolina State University</i>
<u>Spanish</u>	Kinga Zsofia Horvath	Silvia Garcia, PhD <i>IUPUI – Office of Community Engagement</i>

RESEARCHED AND WRITTEN BY

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SPECIAL THANKS TO

Charles Sellen, PhD, for his editorial review; Xiao Han and Kinga Ile for their contribution to the *2023 Global Philanthropy Tracker*; and Liubov Rainchuk and Svitlana Bakhshaliieva from the Zagoriy Foundation for sharing insights on giving to and in Ukraine.

DESIGN WORK BY

Galambos + Associates, LLC and additional communications counsel and video production by VOX Global.

Cover art courtesy of Vecteezy.com. World map on page 04 created with Mapchart.net. National flag icons on pages 49–51 courtesy of Flaticon.com.

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